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GERMAN  NOTES  ON 
MINOR  TACTICS 


V 


TRANSLATED  AND  COMPILED  AT  THE 

ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE 

WASHINGTON,  1917 


WASHINGTON 
GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1918 


WAR  DEPARTMENT. 

Document  No.  713. 

Office  of  The  Adjutant  General. 


WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
WASHINGTON,  December  10,  1917. 

The  following  pamphlet,  entitled  "  German  Notes  on  Minor 
Tactics,"  is  published  for  the  information  of  all  concerned. 

[062.1,  A.  G.  O.] 
IJY  ORDER  OF  THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR  I 

JOHN  BIDDLE, 

Major  General,  Acting  Chief  of  Staff. 
OFFICIAL  : 

H.  P.  MCCAIN, 

The  Adjutant  General. 

3 


€64357 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


Page. 
German  notes  on  minor  tactics: 

Barrage  fire  against  airplanes 7 

Order  for  the  army  group 7 

Note  for  the  artillery  of  the  region  of  Ypres 9 

I.  Activity  of  fire 9 

II.  Emplacements 10 

1.  Process  of  fire 13 

2.  Battery  position 13 

Means  of  liaison  on  the  Somme  front  and  their  utilization 

for  artillery 15 

I.  Artillery  liaisons 15 

II.  Liaison  of  the  other  arms 16 

Information  drawn  from  the  use  of  the  light  machine 

gun,  model  1908-15,  in  the  Sixth  Army 18 

I.  Tactical  employment 18 

II.  Directions  for  instruction 20 

Chicanes  constructed  in  the  auxiliary  defenses  to  allow 

an  offensive 22 

General  principles  for  constructing  chicanes 23 

German  artillery — Organization  of  the  command — Dens- 
ity in  defensive  sectors — Distribution  on  the  ground . .  25 
The  German  artillery  in  line  on  both  banks  of  the  Meuse, 

August  20,  1917 25 

I.  Organization  of  the  command 26 

Essential  mission — Barrage  and   "annihilat- 
ing" fire 26 

II.  Density  of  the  enemy  artillery  in  line 27 

III.  Distribution  of  the  artillery  on  the  ground 29 

Conclusions 30 

The  transmission  of  intelligence  in  the  German  army. . .  31 

I.  General  regulations 31 

II.  Means  of  liaison 32 

A.  Telephone 32 

B.  T.  P.  S.  (earth-conduction  telegraphy) 32 

C.  Infantry  airplane 32 

D.  Panels  of  white  cloth -    33 

E.  Carrier  pigeons 33 

F.  Runners 33 

G.  Intelligence  collection  stations    ("Melde- 

sammelstellen  ") 34 

H.  Observation  posts  inside  the  lines 34 

Transmission  of  signals  for  barrage  fire 34 

5 


6  CONTENTS. 

German  notes  on  minor  tactics — Continued.  Page. 
German  attack  by  gas  wa\es  which  was  to  have  taken 

place  in  Champagne  in  September,  1917 35 

I.  Analysis  of  the  files  of  the  first  Bavarian  division 

relating  to  the  attack  by  gas  waves 35 

Orders  Nos.  1,  2,  and  3  of  the  12th,  13th,  and 

17th  of  August,  1917 35 

General  instructions 35 

Composition  of  the  shock  troops  and  detach- 
ments   37 

Shock  troops  1  to  12 37 

Shock  troops  A,  B,  C 38 

Total  strength  of  the  salvage  and  destruction 

'  squads 38 

Details  of  execution  of  the  operation 39 

Order  No.  4  of  the  25th  of  August,  1917 40 

Postponement  of  the  operation  ' '  sine  die  " 41 

II.  Information  emanating  from  the  papers  of  a  de- 
serter and  the  declarations  of  prisoners 42 

Nature  of  the  gas 42 

Detailed    description    of    the    apparatus    for 

emitting  irritant  gas 42 

Irritant  gas  (reizgas) 42 

Manipulation  of  the  apparatus 43 

Placing  the  gas  bottles 44 

Probable  duration  of  the  attack 46 

Instruction 46 

Masks 46 

Preparation  and  execution  of  the  German  attack  along  the 
ridge  from  the  Mennechet  signal  station  to  the  Cepy 

farm • 47 

Troops  participating  in  the  attack  from  north  to  south .  47 

August  10th  and  llth 50 

Arrangements  made  by  the  German  commander  for 

the  organization  of  the  conquered  terrain 51 

Role  of  the  enemy  artillery  and  trench  mortars 51 

Execution  of  the  attack 52 

Days  following  the  attack 53 

Importance  of  artillery  in  action 53 

Arrangements  made  by  the  enemy  to  organize  the  con- 
quered positions  (Dancourt  trench) 54 

Order  of  the  colonel  in  command  of  the  four  hundred  and 

fifty-first  infantry  regiment 56 

Program  of  works  to  be  constructed  after  August  9, 

1917 56 

Tactics  of  German  assault  detachments 62 

New  defensive  tactics. .                                             i;o 


GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 


BARRAGE  FIRE  AGAINST  AIRPLANES. 


The  appended  translation  of  an  order,  dated  February  7,  1917, 
found  at  the  front  of  the  army  shows  that  the  Germans  then  con- 
sidered special  antiaircraft  pieces  insufficient  for  combat  against 
enemy  airplanes  in  case  of  important  operations,  and  had  con- 
sidered using  barrage  batteries  for  repulsing  low-flying  in- 
fantry airplanes. 

This  order  prescribed  the  initial  training  for  "aerial  bar- 
rage." The  result  of  the  experiment  is  unknown. 

[Ypres  Army  Group.     Artillery  263/17.] 

AEMY  CORPS  HEADQUARTERS, 

'  F«Hrwr$  7,  7.9/7/r* 

ORDER  FOR  THE  ARMY   GROUP.  '  '  '     '        J     '       '    ' 

It  is  not  impossible  that  during  the  next  offensive  the  enemy 
will  attack  our  infantry  in  their  trenches  with  so  large  a  num- 
ber of  aircraft  that  it  will  be  necessary  to  combat  them  not 
only  with  the.  special  antiaircraft  batteries  but  also  with  a  part 
of  the  barrage  batteries. 

In  general,  buried  or  casemated  batteries  will  be  used  against 
enemy  airplanes  flying  above. their  respective  barrage  areas. 
In  short,  momentarily  they  will  have  to  project  aerial  barrages. 

Fire  against  airplanes  should  be  conducted  in  the  simplest 
possible  fashion.  The  distance  separating  the  battery  from  the 
most  advanced  trench  should  be  taken  as  range,  always  sup- 
posing the  direction  of  flight  to  be  perpendicular  to  the  direction 
of  the  barrage  fire.  Direct  laying  should  be  used  when  possible. 
If  not,  the  laying-in  direction  should  be  that  of  the  barrage  fire 
and  should  sweep  the  zone  of  the  barrage  fire. 

7 


8  GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 

• 
Laying-in  elevation  should   be  made  by   means   of  the  gun 

level  or  an  ordinary  level. 

The  range  table  appended 1  has  been  established  for  iield  pieces 
for  an  average  altitude  of  1,000  meters. 

The  enemy  airplanes  can  not  fly  at  very  high  altitudes,  as  the 
effect  of  their  machine  guns  would  then  be  too  reduced. 

If  the  airplane  flies  lower  than  1,000  meters,  the  combined 
use  of  this  range  table  and  direct  laying  would  result  in  plac- 
ing the  point  of  burst  at  too  great  a  distance — that  is,  beyond 
our  first-line  trenches. 

The  second  column  on  the  table  gives  the  deflection  to  be  em- 
ployed, assuming  that  the  speed  of  the  airplane  is  35  meters 
per  second. 

Trials  will  be  made  by  each  division  with  a  battery  of  light 
howitzers  and  a  battery  of  field  guns  to  find  out  if  barrage  fire 
at  an  altitude  of  600  meters,  800  and  1,000  meters  necessitates 
any  change  in  the  construction  of  gun  emplacements. 

For  these  experiments  the  firing  will  be  directed  at  least  100 
meters  beyond  our  most-advanced  trenches;  and  the  first  rounds 
still  further,  to  prevent  accidents. 

The  range  table  gives  a  sufficient  approximation. 

The  fire  will  be  conducted  by  locating  sections.  They  will 
indicate  to 'the  •foatteridb  the  elements  for  the  adjustment  of  the 
height  of  bv.rsf  -Jivf  will  be  charged  with  placing  the  point  of 
burst  at  the  proper  height 

The  result  of  the  experiments  will  be  reported,  and  the  locat- 
ing sections  will  add  their  own  observations.  The  most  prac- 
ticable methods  will  be  proposed.  Batteries  will  indicate'  par- 
ticularly whether  barrage  is  to  be  made  simultaneously  at  two 
different  heights  (600  and  800  meters,  for  example)  or  at  a 
single  average  height. 

The  locating  sections  will  next  make  out  range  tables,  placing 
the  point  of  burst  above  our  first:line  trench. 

Vox  TIIAKR, 
Lieutenant  Colonel,  Chief  of  Staff. 

1  This  document  missing. 


NOTE  FOR  THE  ARTILLERY  OF  THE  REGION  OF 

YPRES. 


In  order  to  assure,  in  case  of  relief,  continuity  in  the  methods 
of  combat  and  of  construction  of  positions,  the  following  regu- 
lations shall  be  strictly  observed : 

I.  ACTIVITY  OF  FIRE. 

(a)  The  principal  objective  is  the  destruction  of  the  enemy 
batteries.  Insufficient  expenditure  of  ammunition  is  equivalent 
to  waste.  From  400  to  500  rounds  are  necessary.  In  general, 
the  number  of  rounds  of  15  cm.  fired  should  not  exceed  one-half 
the  total  number  of  rounds,  as  the  supply  of  15-cm.  shells  is  at 
present  limited.  The  balance  shall  be  field  artillery  fire.  To 
destroy  especially  important  batteries,  the  above  figure  may  be 
exceeded. 

Never  lose  a  single  opportunity  of  counter  battering  the  enemy 
artillery ;  call  on  the  drachens,  the  aviation  service,  the  locating 
sections.  The  latter  use  here  a  very  sure  procedure.  Batteries 
located  at  night  should  immediately  be  counter  battered,  with 
the  aid  of  the  locating  sections,  by  batteries  equipped  with  anti- 
flash  bags  or  by  .other  batteries  firing  from  especially  chosen 
emplacements.  Fire  for  effect  can  immediately  follow  the  fire 
for  adjustment  even  if  observation  has  become  impossible. 

When  the  fire  for  demolition  has  ended,  execute  on  several 
successive  days,  at  irregular  intervals,  short  harassing  fires  with 
single  time-fuse  shells  to  hit  the  detachments  clearing  up  the 
debris. 

(&)  Bracket  as  many  battery  emplacements  as  possible  in 
order  to  have  the  data  for  fire  with  gas  shells  or  to  be  prepared 
if  necessary  to  execute  surprise  concentrations  of  fire. 

(c)  Fire  on  trenches  only  in  case  of  absolute  necessity,  and 
then  deliver  only  observed  fire  (except  in  case  of  fire  for  anni- 
hilation). Avoid  incessant  regulation  of  barrage  and  registra- 
tion fire.  Do  not  fire  on  trenches  without  endeavoring  to  destroy 
31279°— 18 2  9 


10  GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 

trench  mortars,  machine  guns,  or  shelters.  The  first  trench 
generally  is  not  occupied.  In  this  region,  shelters  for  personnel 
or  for  kitchens  are  generally  in  the  trenches  farther  to  the 
rear  (most  often  far  to  the  rear).  If  fire  on  the  trenches  is 
necessary,  it  is  on  these  constantly  occupied  parts  that  it  should 
principally  be  directed.  It  is  advisable  to  prepare  occasional 
"mass  fire,"  i.  e.,  concentrated  fire  by  several  batteries  on 
especially  important  targets.  Launch  this  fire  by  a  short  order, 
such  as  "  Mass  fire  for  three  minutes  on  point  723." 

(d)  Before  or  after  adjustment  of  fire  by  airplane,  balloon,  or 
locating  section,  it  is  generally  advisable  to  choose  a  clearly 
visible  auxiliary  target  and  adjust  in  range  and,  if  possible,  also 
in  height  of  burst   (for  example,  when  there  is  a  steeple  or  a 
chimney  available)  ;  by  means  of  this  auxiliary  target  it  will  be 
possible  at  any  time  to  determine  the  corrections  of  the  day 
and  make  corresponding  changes  in  the  data  for  fire  on  the 
target  itself.    Auxiliary  targets  situated  very  close  to  the  target 
are  the  best.    This  applies  also  to  barrage  fires. 

(e)  When  our  airplanes  are  in  the  air,  they  should  always 
dispose  of  one  or  two  batteries,  in  order  that  they  may  be  able 
immediately  to  have  fire  delivered  on  important  targets,  such  as 
trains  or  assemblies  of  troops. 

(/)  For  barrage  fire,  use  the  reduced  charge  as  far  as  possible, 
in  order  to  save  wear  on  the  tubes. 

Batteries  of  heavy  guns  and  mortars  should  not  take  part  in 
barrage  except  by  order  of  the  general  commanding  the  group 
or  in  cases  of  absolute  necessity.  Regulate  barrage  fire  with 
all  the  guns  and  not  merely  with  the  directing  gun.  For  barrage 
fire  make  the  adjustments  in  range  for  each  piece.  For  fire  on 
trenches  and  for  control  of  barrage  fire,  always  come  to  an 
understanding  with  the  infantry  officers  interested. 

(g)  In  case  of  enemy  aerial  activity,  a  careful  decision  must 
be  made  in  each  instance  under  the  actual  circumstances  whether 
it  is  not  more  profitable  to  avoid  disclosing  the  emplacement  of 
the  gun  than  to  execute  the  fire  under  contemplation. 

(h)  When  enemy  fire  for  adjustment  on  one  of  our  batteries 
has  been  observed,  the  battery  should  as  far  as  possible  before 
the  fire  for  effect,  which  often  is  not  delivered  until  a  day  later, 
avoid  danger  by  removing  to  an  alternative  emplacement. 

II.  EMPLACEMENTS. 

(a)  Echelon  th(>  Mrtillcry  in  depth,  arrange  the  battery  em- 
placements checkerwise,  in  order  that  If  the  enemy  penetrates 


GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS.  11 

the  lines,  all  batteries  shall  not  be  put  out  of  action  at  the  same 
time. 

In  order  to  have  a  reserve  ready  in  case  of  enemy  penetration 
to  support  the  counter  attack  immediately,  it  is  advisable  to 
establish  from  the  first,  for  each  divisional  sector,  one  or  two 
batteries  about  5,000  meters  back  of  the  first  lines. 

For  these  reserve  batteries  it  is  often  advantageous  to  have 
elevated  emplacements  (to  secure  the  advantage  of  direct  fire 
on  enemy  elements  which  may  have  penetrated  our  lines,  on 
tanks,  etc.).;  build  strongly  of  concrete;  do  not  fire  the  guns 
often. 

(&)  The  thickness  of  reinforced  and  compressed  concrete 
should  whenever  possible  be  as  much  as  1.50  meters.  Only  con- 
crete which  has  been  prepared  according  to  rule  withstands 
bombardment.  Concrete  blocks  will  not  do  this.  Organize  the 
principal  emplacement  strongly.  At  the  same  time  construct 
at  the  alternative  emplacement  very  strong  isolated  shelters  for 
the  men  and  also  some  ammunition  shelters.  For  protection 
against  direct  hits  penetrating  under  the  shelter,  it  is  necessary 
to  give  it  a  strong  concrete  floor.  Also  organize  strong  observa- 
tion posts,  first  establishing  isolated  posts  with  very  wide  fields, 
then  complete  the  system  according  to  needs.  It  is  the  province 
of  the  artillery  commander  to  regulate  the  order  of  urgency 
of  these  works.  Observation  posts  are  equally  necessary  in  the 
zone  of  the  rear,  and  one  should  therefore  be  organized  near 
each  battery  to  provide  for  the  case  of  the  enemy  penetrating  the 
lines.  An  observation  post  should  also  be  prepared  for  each 
group  commander.  As  far  as  possible,  the  field  of  fire  of  these 
pieces  should  be  120°. 

(c)  At  a  distance  of  from  100  .to  400  meters  from  each  bat- 
tery, establish  a.  firing  emplacement  for  a  section  or  piece.     The 
latter  should  be  of  strong  concrete  and  well  masked ;  it  will  serve 
to  satisfy  the  daily  requirements  for  fire  in  order  to  conceal 
the  principal  position   from  enemy  aerial   observation.     It   is 
often  advantageous  to  use  for  this  purpose  the  best  gun  em- 
placements of  abandoned  battery  positions. 

Construct  isolated  shelters,  principally  ammunition  shelters, 
at  the  sides  of  the  battery  and  outside  it. 

(d)  Simulated  emplacements. — In  general  it  is  necessary  by 
all  possible  means  to  throw  the  enemy  on  false  scents.     Mobile 
sections  must  constantly  fire,  especially  at  night,  with  frequent 
changes  of  position.     Simulated  emplacements  must  be  given, 
even  in  the  most  minute  details,  the  appearance  of  occupied 


12  GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 

emplacements.  Fires  will  be  lighted  to  produce  smoke;  trails 
and  Decauville  roads  will  be  built,  actual  fire  delivered  from 
the  emplacement,  etc. 

In  all  simulated  emplacements  particular  care  must  be  given 
to  imitating  the  stain  on  the  ground  produced  under  the  muzzle 
of  a  gun  by  the  flame  and  blast  of  its  discharge.  This  is  the 
detail  which  makes  it  possible  to  recognize  a  well-masked  bat- 
tery on  photographs.  The  absence  of  this  stain  reveals  that 
the  battery  is  not  occupied. 

To  deceive  the  enemy  some  pieces  should  be  made  to  continue 
fire  from  emplacements  which  have  been  abandoned  by  reason 
of  the  enemy  fire.  Flashes  of  discharge  can  be  imitated  by  the 
electric  process  and  at  the  same  instant  fire  can  be  delivered 
by  a  battery  equipped  with  antiflash  devices.  This  is  an  excel- 
lent means  of  deceiving  the  enemy. 

(e)  Too  little  attention  is  generally  paid  to  protection  against 
view  from  aircraft.  Our  camouflage  must  constantly  be  im- 
proved by  study  of  our  own  aerial  photographs.  There  is  a  very 
special  advantage  in  camouflaging  our  positions  to  conceal  them 
from  aerial  photography.  All  sharp  edges,  clearly  outlined 
shadows,  regular  lines  and  figures  must  be  avoided.  Prolong 
roads,  Decauville  lines  and  trails  up  to  false  batteries  or  harrow 
up  the  trails  every  day.  Conceal  the  stain  under  the  muzzle  by 
a  camouflaged  trellis  or  similar  device. 

(/)  As  far  as  possible  all  real  fire  should  be  masked  by  that 
of  a  false  battery  or  by  exploding  flash  devices. 

(#)  Be  prudent  in  the  use  of  smoke,  lighting  several  smoke 
boxes  simultaneously  on  a  wide  front  not  too  close  to  the  bat- 
teries, the  distance  varying  between  100  and  200  meters,  accord- 
ing to  the  wind,  in  order  not  to  reveal  the  battery.  Isolated  use 
of  smoke  boxes  at  different  points  of  the  ground  gives  a  perfect 
imitation  of  explosions  and  of  battery  emplacements.  This 
process  can  be  used  to  advantage  in  many  cases. 

(h)  The  declination  here  is  13°  15',  which  is  equivalent  to  the 
reading  of  212  for  the  fortress  artillery  and  235  for  the  field 
jirtillery. 

(i)  If  the  battery  emplacements  have  no  cemented  shelters 
for  the  ammunition,  the  following  arrangement  for  depots  will 
be  exclusively  used:  Arrange  the  ammunition  on  planks  in 
small  heaps  surrounded  by  small  dikes  of  earth  and  protected 
ji.irainst  rain  by  a  light  roof,  preferably  of  corrugated  iron. 
Leave  sufficient  intervals  between  the  heaps. 

(Signed)  KUHNK. 


GERMAN  NOTES   ON  MINOR  TACTICS.  13 

The  above  instruction  suggests  the  following  remarks: 

1.  PROCESS  OF  FIRE. 

The  first  point  to  note  is  the  instructions  in  regard  to  the 
number  of  rounds  to  fire  for  the  demolition  of  a  battery  position. 
This  number  is  given  as  500,  but  with  the  recommendation  that 
not  more  than  one-half  of  the  fire  be  with  15-cm.  shells,  the 
other  half  being  with  smaller  caliber  shells.  It  is  evident  that 
the  effectiveness  of  the  fire  will  be  considerably  reduced  by  this 
practice.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  reason  for  it  is  need 
for  economy. 

Immediate  fire  for  demolition  on  batteries  located  at  night 
is  highly  recommended,  and  in  this  connection  allusion  is  made 
to  the  very  sure  processes  used  for  adjustment  of  fire  by  the 
locating  sections.  This  tendency  of  the  enemy  to  adjust  fire 
by  night  by  means  of  the  locating  sections  is  interesting  to  note. 

It  is  also  to  be  noted  that  when  the  German  airplanes  are 
in  the  air  they  should  always  dispose  of  one  or  two  batteries 
in  order  to  be  able  to  fire  immediately  on  important  targets,  sucli 
as  trains,  columns,  etc. 

2.  BATTERY  POSITION. 

(a)  In  practice  it  was  not  found  in  the  course  of  the  attacks 
of  July  31  and  August  16  that  the  enemy  disclosed  any  distant 
batteries  constructed  on  the  principle  here  contemplated,  5.000 
meters  behind  the  lines  for  barrage  fire. 

In  general,  no  unknown  batteries  were  noted  during  the  de- 
velopment of  the  attacks,  except  about  August  16  in  the  region 
to  the  east  of  Houthulst  Forest,  where  the  photographs  had  not 
revealed  battery  positions  organized  in  advance  and  where  the 
pieces  concerned  were  no  doubt  long-range  pieces  which  had 
been  obliged  to  retire  to  the  rear. 

(1))  Construction. — Concrete,  the  use  of  which  was  recom- 
mended in  the  note,  was  largely  used  in  accordance  with  the 
principles  prescribed,  and  the  recent  test  well  demonstrates  that 
"  concrete  prepared  according  to  rule  withstands  bombardment." 
Batteries  47-80  and  47-83  (Bois  de  la  Ferme)  may  be  cited. 
The  first  apparently  corresponded  to  four  unsheltered  or  weakly 
casemated  pieces,  the  emplacements  of  which,  now  completely 
overturned,  were  separated  by  concrete  shelters ;  the  second  was 
constructed  for  two  pieces,  the  emplacements  for  which  were 


14  GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 

prepared  in  a  cast  concrete  work,  which  now  appears  as  a 
single  concrete  block  about  15  meters  long. 

Against  the  first  fire  of  250  rounds  of  220-mm.  shells  was  de- 
livered on  three  different  occasions ;  against  the  second,  one  fire 
of  300  rounds  o'f  220-rnrn.  shells  was  delivered.  Now,  of  the  six 
cement  shelters  of  47-80,  only  one  was  slightly  broken  into, 
while  the  block  of  47-83  remains  almost  intact.  (The  positions 
had,  nevertheless,  become  untenable  for  the  artillery.)  Experi- 
ence has  also  shown  that  constructions  of  concrete  in  slabs 
or  blocks  prepared  in  advance  and  separated  do  not  withstand 
fire  for  demolition  delivered  by  heavy  artillery. 

(c)  The  precaution  taken  of  installing  at  from  100  to  400 
meters  from  each  battery  a  firing  emplacement  for  a  section  or 
a  piece  has  not  prevented  the  battery  emplacements  from  being 
demolished  or  rendered  useless  by  our  fire,  as  our  artillery  took 
for  targets  all  concrete  shelters  which  had  been  located   on 
photographs  and  shown  on  maps. 

In  conformity  with  the  above  instructions  the  ammunition 
shelters  had  been  installed  at  the  sides  of  the  batteries  and  out- 
side them. 

(d)  The  precautions  suggested  f$r  false  batteries  are  very 
judicious.     It  seems  impossible,  however,  to  take  such  precau- 
tions except  in  a  quiet  sector  and  the  enemy  seems  not,  in  fact, 
to  have  had  either  leisure  or  means  for  them  since  July  1.    He 
has,  however,  on  several  occasions  endeavored  to  make  us  be- 
lieve that  he  was  continuing  to  occupy  a  position,  either  by 
simulating  activity  of  a  piece  on  the  day  following  a  fire  for 
demolition,  or  by  actually  keeping  a  piece  there  when  the  ground 
was  so  torn  up  that  the  piece  could  not  be  removed. 

(e)  The  precautions  for  camouflage  can  be  taken  only  during 
a  period  of  inactivity.    In  fact,  the  enemy  has  done  little  in  the 
way  of  such  precautions  during  the  course  of  the  operations. 
He  did,  indeed,  try  to  conceal  trails  by  harrowing,  but  the  work 
was  not  cleverly  done. 

(g)  The  enemy  used  smoke  at  the  commencement  of  our 
offensive,  but  abandoned  the  practice  rather  early. 

In  a  general  way  our  counter-battery  work  was  not  seriously 
embarrassed  by  it. 


MEANS   OF  LIAISON   ON   THE  SOMME  FRONT  AND 
THEIR  UTILIZATION  FOR  ARTILLERY. 


I.  ARTILLERY  LIAISONS. 

1.  Regardless  of  the  number  of  liaisons  installed  by  the  in- 
fantry with  the  rear,  the  artillery  must,  as  a  matter  of  principle, 
itself  organize  the  liaisons  which  it  needs  in  order  to  receive 
the  reports  of  its  liaison  officers  and  first-line  observation  officers 
and  in  order  to  direct  its  fire. 

2.  The  means  of  liaison  of  which  the  artillery  can  dispose  are : 

(a)  The  telephone. — See  "Composition  of  telephone  material 
equipment"   (supplement  to  the  Ministerial  Circular  of  Sept. 
17,  1915). 

(b)  Signal  material. — Allotment  (see  Ministerial  Circular  of 
Oct.  9,  1916). 

Brigade  staff :  Two  medium  signal  lamps,  model  16. 
Regimental  staff:  Four  medium  signal  lamps. 
Battalion  staff:  Four  medium   signal  lamps  and   six 
small  signal  lamps,  model  16. 

(c)  Signal  pistols. — Allotment   (see  order  of  the  Fifty-sixth 
Division,  dated  Oct.  28,  1916). 

Battalion  staff :  Two  pistols. 
Battery :  Three  pistols. 

(d)  Signalwerfer.1 — Allotment   (see  order  of  the  Fifty -sixth 
Division,  dated  Nov.  30,  1916). 

Regimental  and  battalion  staff:  One  apiece. 
Each  battery :  Two. 

(e)  Runners — Couriers. — Relays  for  runners  and  couriers. 

3.  Before  these  various  means  of  liaison  are  used  the  ground 
must  be  very  thoroughly  reconnoitered  by  officers.    On  the  basis 
of  these  reconnaissances  the  staffs  will  prepare  the  plan  for 
their  liaison  network. 

1  !vote  by  French  translator  of  the  German  document :  "  The  Signal- 
werfer is  an  apparatus  for  throwing  illuminating  signals  (signal  bombs) 
more  powerful  than  those  used  with  signal  pistols  and  thrown  to  a 
greater  height." 

15 


16  GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 

4.  Rules  for  the  reconnaissance  of  the  ground  preparatory  to 
organizing  liaison : 

(a)  Telephonic  liaison  along  the  line  of  relays. — Install  In- 
termediate telephone  stations;  use  the  relay  posts  of  runners 
not  only  for  the  transmission  of  messages  but  also  as  crews  for 
hunting  telephone-line  trouble. 

(&)  Place  the  visual  signal  stations  near  the  telephone  sta- 
tions and  the  lines  of  relays ;  if  they  are  not  so  placed,  provide 
the  visual  signal  stations  with  liaison  by  means  of  telephone 
and  runners. 

(c)  Utilize  the  natural  shelters  of  the  ground ;  avoid  dwell- 
ings and  exposed  sites. 

5.  Inspect  from  this  point  of  view  all  liaisons  already  installed 
and  improve  them  where  possible. 

6.  Make  a  sketch  showing  the  whole  liaison  network;  repro- 
duce this  sketch  in  numerous  copies;  distribute  copies  to  all 
batteries  directly  interested  in  knowing  the  network,  to  adjoin- 
ing battalions  of  artillery,  to  the  infantry  of  the  same  unit,  to 
the  various  liaison  organs  (observation  and  liaison  officers  and 
the  personnel  assisting  them,  runners,  couriers,  visual  signal 
posts)  ;  report  the  installation  of  the  liaison  network  to  the 
superior  authorities. 

7.  Practice  transmitting  messages  along  a  liaison  line  of  a 
certain  length,  only  part  of  which  has  a  telephone  line,  using 
visual  signals  and  relay  posts. 

8.  Perfect  operation  of  any  liaison  service  is  possible  only 
when  it  is  permanently  supervised  by  energetic  officers  or  non- 
commissioned officers. 

II.  LIAISON  OF  THE  OTHER  ARMS. 

1.  Staffs  are  under  obligation  to  make  sure,  as  soon  as  they 
are  in  line,  that  all  liaisons  taken  over  from  the  force  they 
relieve  are  in  working  order;  they  will  constantly  test  them  to 
see  if  the  liaison  still  exists.     Distribution  will  be  made  to  all 
batteries  and  all  interested  organs  of  sketches  of  the  liaisons 
available  for  their  service. 

2.  The  means  of  liaison  at  the  disposal  of  the  infantry  are — 
(a)  The  telephone. 

(6)  The  visual-signal  material. 

(c)  The  signal  pistols  and  signalwerfer. 

(d)  The  Ahrend  posts  for  earth-conduction  telegraphy. 


GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS.  17 

(e)  Liaison  by  signal  lamps  with  infantry  airplanes;  then 
liaison  between  infantry  airplanes  and  wireless  stations  of  divi- 
sions, artillery  commanders  and  infantry  sector  commanders. 
Each  staff,  each  battery,  must  know  the  emplacement  of  the 
nearest  wireless  and  must  get  in  communication  with  it  imme- 
diately ;  this  communication  will  be  maintained  as  permanently 
as  possible  and  will  exist  when  all  other  means  of  liaison  toward 
the  front  fail. 

These  wireless  stations  will  also  intercept  all  radiograms  trans- 
mitted by  the  wireless  stations  of  the  advanced  lines  and  will 
thus  continue  to  receive  messages  even  when  there  are  no  in- 
fantry airplanes  in  the  air. 

(/)  The  relay  posts. 

(ff)  Report  centralization  posts;  officers  will  be  detailed  to 
these  posts  to  exploit  immediately  all  messages  of  value  to  the 
artillery. 

(h)  Carrier  pigeons  and  courier  dogs. 

3.  When  the  artillery  wishes  to  utilize  a  liaison  line,  it  will 
connect  itself  with  this  line  by  telephone  or  will  detail  liaison 
agents  to  it. 

4.  Each  observation  and  liaison  officer  must  know  and  be 
able  to  utilize  all  the  means  of  liaison  which  are  available  for 
him.    He  will  inform  the  authority  which  sent  him  of  the  means 
of  liaison  at  his  disposal,  in  order  that  they  may  establish  com- 
munication with  his  receiving  station. 

(Signed)  VON  HORN. 

31279°— 18 3 


INFORMATION  DRAWN  FROM  THE  USE  OF  THE 
LIGHT  MACHINE  GUN,  MODEL  1908-15,  IN  THF 
SIXTH  ARMY. 

[Extract] 


The  1908-15  machine  gun  is  capable  of  giving  very  good  results 
in  the  hands  of  men  who  have  perfect  knowledge  of  the  arm  and 
its  handling,  commanded  by  officers  who  have  a  very  exact 
understanding  of  the  conditions  under  which  it  should  be  used 
in  battle. 

As  the  1908-15  machine  guns  were  distributed  to  the  troops 
rather  tardily,  sufficient  use  has  heretofore  not  been  made  of 
this  weapon,  for  the  men  have  not  received  the  thorough  technical 
instruction  which  is  absolutely  necessary  for  the  use  of  the 
guns. 

It  is  extremely  urgent  that  the  infantry  regiments  of  the  divi- 
sions which  have  been  withdrawn  from  the  front  be  provided 
with  1908-15  machine  guns  for  instruction  purposes.  It  is  also 
advisable  that  not  only  the  gunner  but  the  other  two  men  serv- 
ing the  1908-15  machine  gun  should  be  armed  with  carbines  in 
order  that  these  three  men  should  not  be  completely  lost  for 
combat  in  case  the  machine  gun  should  not  work. 

I.  TACTICAL  EMPLOYMENT. 

Use  in  the  trench. — The  1908-15  machine  gun  should  always  be 
used  near  the  platoon  commander,  who  assigns  the  machino 
gunners  the  post  which  they  must  occupy.  The  battalion  com- 
mander should  keep  a  reserve  of  these  guns  near  him  for  pos- 
sible counter  attacks.  The  troops  should  not  forget  that  the  use 
of  the  1908-15  machine  gun  should  be  entirely  independent  of 
Hint  of  the  1908  machine  gun  of  the  machine-gun  companies. 
It  is  on  this  principle  that  the  emplacements  of  the  1908-15  ma- 
chine guns  must  be  determined. 

They  should  be  posted  in  the  first  line,  in  shell  craters,  or  In 

other  available  places  which  have  been  reconnoitered  in  advance. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  arrange  them  in  platoons,  but  very  special 

importance  should  be  attached  to  flanking  fire,  which  should 

18 


GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS.  19 

be  practiced  in  such  a  way  that  two  machine  guns  posted  at 
different  points  can  both  sweep  the  same  ground.  This  model 
of  machine  gun  should  not  fire  over  the  heads  of  infantry  and 
therefore  should  be  installed  between  the  first  and  second  line 
only  in  very  exceptional  cases.  Their  emplacement  should  be 
changed  frequently  in  order  to  deceive  the  enemy  about  their 
position  and  to  keep  them  as  long  as  possible  sheltered  from 
artillery  fire  and  from  view  by  airplanes.  This  is  the  only 
means  of  securing  full  advantage  of  their  great  mobility  on 
ground  full  of  shell  craters,  of  the  facility  with  which  they  can 
be  concealed  from  terrestrial  and  aerial  observation,  of  their 
ease  of  operation.  The  end  of  the  small  communication  trenches 
in  front  of  the  first  trench  also  offers  a  favorable  emplacement 
for  isolated  machine  guns  of  this  model,  free  from  risk  of  sur- 
prise fire. 

Good  results  can  be  obtained  by  fire  on  momentary  targets 
(men  working  on  auxiliary  defenses,  detachments  of  carriers, 
at  night,  in  front  of  our  lines)  ;  this  is  true  of  fire  on  offensive 
patrols  and  on  troops  marching  to  the  assault. 

Bursts  of  harassing  fire  executed  by  surprise  in  short  volleys 
have  also  had  very  good  results.  It  should  not  be  forgotten, 
however,  that  the  precision  of  the  1908-15  machine  gun  is  lim- 
ited and  that  this  fact  must  be  taken  into  account  in  regulating 
its  utilization.  This  gun  must  never  completely  take  the  place 
of  infantry,  but,  on  the  contrary,  the  infantry  must  have  clearly 
in  mind  that  for  them  the  1908-15  machine  gun  is  only  a  means 
of  increasing  their  firing  capacity.  By  reason  of  imperfections 
of  a  technical  order  the  1908-15  model  does  not  serve  entirely 
to  replace  the  1908  machine  gun. 

In  mobile  defense  the  1908-15  machine  gun  is  indispensable. 
In  this  case  it  is  posted  either  in  the  advanced  first  line  or  in 
front  of  the  first  line  proper,  in  machine-gun  nests,  shell  craters, 
etc.  Its  high  capacity  for  fire  will  bring  a  certain  moral  support 
to  the  first-line  infantry. 

On  the  attack  the  1908-15  machine  gun,  well  handled  and  judi- 
ciously posted,  brings  a  very  valuable  increase  in  the  volume  of 
fire.  In  this  case  it  can  be  carried  forward  with  the  first  line 
and  used  to  fire  on  the  parts  of  the  enemy  trench  before  which 
our  attack  is  stopped.  This  requires  a  certain  spirit  of  initia- 
tive. An  effort  should  also  be  made  always  to  use  the  1908-15 
machine  gun  near  the  platoon  commander  in  order  that  the  lat- 
ter may  be  able  to  throw  it  rapidly  during  the  battle  to  the 
most  favorable  place. 


20  GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 

In  small  enterprises  the  gun  can  be  used  very  effectively  to 
protect  the  flanks  of  the  infantry  attack  and  to  support  the  attack 
in  case  of  need.  The  gun  should  not  be  carried  prematurely  into 
a  newly  conquered  position,  but  should  be  brought  up  only  when 
the  bomb  fighting  has  ended.  While  waiting,  the  gun  remains 
in  front  of  the  enemy  trench  and  observes  the  ground  toward 
the  enemy,  looking  'for  important  targets.  When  it  has  once 
been  installed  in  the  conquered  trench,  its  task  is  to  protect 
the  flanks  or  to  stop  enemy  counter  attacks  if  any  are  deliv- 
ered. It  is  absolutely  indispensable  in  this  case  to  protect  the 
gun  by  special  details  of  bomb  throwers.  By  reason  of  its  ex- 
tremely light  weight,  the  1908-15  machine  gun  is  perfectly 
capable,  with  some  dragging,  of  following  the  infantry.  It  is 
not  at  all  too  heavy  for  this  (with  water  reservoir,  drum,  and 
belt  it  weighs  22  kilos.)  The  1908  machine  gun  (which  weighs 
25  kilos  with  water  reservoir  and  assault  carriage)  has  already 
frequently  been  used  in  assaults. 

//  the  1908-15  machine  gun  is  used  judiciously,  the  consump- 
tion of  ammunition  is  not  excessive,  from  1,200  to  1,500  car- 
tridges should  be  enough.  It  should  not  deliver  continuous  fire, 
but  should  be  used  only  for  precise  fire  on  targets  which  are 
offered  under  particularly  favorable  conditions.  The  highest 
consumption  of  ammunition  which  has  heretofore  been  reported 
is  5,000  cartridges.  This  was  an  exceptional  case  where  the 
targets  were  extraordinarily  advantageous.  The  longest  con- 
tinuous fire  was  250  cartridges. 

The  1908-15  machine  gun  should  regularly  be  placed  under  the 
orders  of  the  infantry  company  commander,  both  for  its  tactical 
use  and  for  ammunition  supply.  The  machine-gun  officer  of 
the  regimental  staff  is  responsible  only  for  the  care  of  the  gun 
after  battle.  For  this  reason  the  replenishment  of  ammunition 
for  this  model  gun  should  be  completely  independent  of  that  of 
the  machine-gun  companies.  The  latter,  moreover,  will  gener- 
ally be  between  the  lines  or  in  rear  of  the  first  trench. 

For  all  men  of  the  infantry  carriers'  detachment  detailed  to 
supply  the  1908-15  machine  guns  with  ammunition,  it  should  be 
a  duty  of  honor  to  bring  back  to  the  ammunition  depot  near 
the  battalion  commander  all  empty  cartridge  boxes  and  belts. 
They  must  be  carefully  trained  in  this  practice. 

II.  DIRECTIONS  FOR  INSTRUCTION. 

The  1908-15  machine  gun  can  be  used  with  profit  only  by  a  well- 
trained  machine-gun  man  thoroughly  familiar  with  the  technique 


GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS.  81 

of  this  model  of  machine  gun.  Jams  should  not  embarrass  him. 
He  should,  first  of  all,  learn  the  following  points:  How  to  put 
the  machine  gun  rapidly  into  position  in  a  shell  crater  without 
letting  the  barrel  touch  the  edge  of  the  crater ;  to  change  breech- 
blocks and  tubes  at  the  bottom  of  a  shell  hole ;  to  load  under  the 
most  unfavorable  conditions,  even  if  his  body  is  very  cramped 
in  its  movements;  to  carry  the  machine  gun  while  crawling; 
to  spring  from  one  shell  crater  to  another  carrying  the  machine 
gun  slung  o\Ter  the  shoulder.  It  is  necessary  thoroughly  to  con- 
vince the  machine-gun  man  that  his  weapon  yields  nothing  to 
the  infantry  for  mobility,  and  this  conviction  can  be  developed 
in  him  by  exercising  him  energetically  and  incessantly  in 
jumping. 

His  training  must  also  habituate  the  machine-gun  man  to  act 
promptly  and  on  his  own  initiative,  and  must  also  endeavor  to 
develop  in  him  a  certain  tactical  sense  in  view  of  the  different 
situations  he  may  encounter  during  the  course  of  an  action.  For 
this  purpose  drills  in  detail,  executed  in  concert  with  the  infan- 
try, are  absolutely  necessary. 

It  is  only  by  satisfying  these  conditions  that  this  fine  weapon 
can  be  made  to  give  its  maximum  results. 


CHICANES  CONSTRUCTED  IN  THE  AUXILIARY  DE- 
FENSES TO  ALLOW  AN  OFFENSIVE. 


The  auxiliary  defenses  set  up  in  front  of  positions,  obstacles, 
and  dense  wire  entanglements,  distributed  over  the  ground, 
cause  great  difficulty  in  carrying  out  an  offensive  movement  and 
putting  the  troops  forward  to  an  engagement. 

Chicanes  have  been  introduced  into  the  lines  of  auxiliary  de- 
fenses and  main  obstacles  of  the  Wilhelm  position ;  these 
chicanes  are  marked  on  the  terrain  so  that  they  can  be  recog- 
nized. A  map  is  now  being  drawn  up  showing  the  chicanes; 
these  maps  will  be  distributed  to  the  troops. 

The  chicanes  will  be  methodically  multiplied  in  the  Albrecht 
position.  It  is  advisable  to  include  chicanes  in  all  the  new 
lines  of  defense. 

The  constant  improvement  in  the  obstacles  and  wire  entangle- 
ments on  the  intervening  ground  and  the  need  of  watching  them 
prevent  all  the  chicanes  from  being  shown  on  a  map  of  a  sector 
for  an  entire  division. 

Because  of  this  it  is  necessary  for  all  the  security  detach- 
ments who  occupy  the  positions  and  works  defending  the  inter- 
vening ground  (machine-gun  nests)  to  know  exactly  the  posi- 
t  ions  of  the  near-by  chicanes  in  order  to  be  able  to  provide  guides 
when  necessary.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  commanders  of  the  ma- 
chine-gun companies  to  give  detailed  information  to  the  per- 
sonnel of  the  machine-gun  nests.  The  passages  will  be  indi- 
cated on  a  diagram.  The  reconnaissance  of  chicanes  is  part  of 
the  instruction  of  machine  gunners. 

This  diagram  will  be  handed  over  at  each  relief,  together 
with  the  other  instructions  to  the  men  coming  into  the  position. 
The  machine-gun  officer  of  the  division  will  be  responsible  for 
the  execution  of  this  order.  Also  each  detachment,  on  coming 
into  the  position,  will  send  out  scouts  to  reconnoiter  the  position 
of  the  chicanes  and  afterwards  be  responsible  for  them. 

The  scouts  will  carry  wire  cutters;  for  signaling  they  will 
carry  flash  lights. 

With  their  periodic  report  the  commander  of  the  pioneers 
will  hand  in  diagrams  of  the  chicanes  in  the  obstacles  of  the 
22 


GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS.  23 

Wieltje  and  Furtuin  position  and  the  engineer  officers  of  sectors 
II  and  VI  will  hand  in  diagrams  for  the  Albrecht  position. 

They  will  indicate  the  width  of  each  chicane.  The  orders  for 
making  new  chicanes  will  be  given  according  to  the  necessity. 

When  installing  auxiliary  defenses  on  the  intervening  ground, 
one  generally  uses  only  very  short  entanglements  and  does  not 
extend  them  parallel  to  the  positions ;  this  very  often  does  away 
with  the  making  of  chicanes.  If  the  entanglement  is  more  than 
150  meters  in  length  and  runs  parallel  to  the  position,  chicanes 
are  necessary.  The  engineer  officers  will  show  the  chicanes  in 
their  periodic  reports. 

GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  FOR  CONSTRUCTING  CHICANES. 

Each  passage  should  have  a  width  of  4  to  5  meters ;  the  pas- 
sages will  always  be  in  groups ;  for  example,  there  will  be  four 
passages  in  80  to  100  meters  of  entanglement.  A  subsequent 
order  will  indicate  the  number  of  groups  of  passages  that  it  is 
necessary  to  have. 

On  a  single  line  of  entanglements  placed  in  the  open  the  pas- 
sages will  run  obliquely,  so  that  they  are  not  visible  from  the 
direction  of  the  enemy. 


In  entanglements  of  two  or  three  rows  of  wire  the  gaps  in 
the  lines  will  be  staggered ;  the  passages  will  run  parallel  to  the 
lines  and  the  men  will  follow  them  from  one  chicane  to  the  other. 


24  GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS: 

When  the  entanglements  (  are  made  up  of  wire  hedges,  the 
chicanes  will  be  left  open  on  the  side  of  the  enemy  and  closed 
on  our  side  with  chevaux  de  frise. 


/VWWVWWVWM/WN. 


W/l/MKWWk  /WV  \  A/y  y;  *M  \'i!/ni 


In  chicanes  intended  exclusively  for  infantry  the  stakes  are 
left  standing  and  wire  is  placed  near  them  for  closing  the 
chicanes.  In  chicanes  intended  for  use  by  both  infantry  and 
artillery  the  stakes  are  taken  out  and  chevaux  de  frise  are 
placed  near  the  chicanes. 

It  is  useless  to  attempt  chicanes  for  artillery  in  the  Albrecht 
position  and  in  wire-hedge  entanglements. 

To  prevent  the  grass  near  the  chicanes  from  becoming  tram- 
pled down,  which  would  render  the  passages  visible  and  allow 
them  to  be  recognized  in  the  enemy's  photographs,  it  is  forbidden 
to  use  them  for  ordinary  passage.  The  old  passages  near  the 
paths  and  roads  will  have  to  be  used. 

(Signed)  VON  DKWITZ. 


GERMAN  ARTILLERY. 


ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  COMMAND— DENSITY  IN  DEFENSIVE  SEC- 
TORS—DISTRIBUTION ON  THE  GROUND. 

The  following  investigation  of  the  organization  of  the  com- 
mand of  the  artillery  in  the  German  Army  is  published  for  its 
value  as  information.  It  brings  out  the  two  following  principal 
points : 

1.  All  artillery  in  position  in  a  sector,  with  the  exception  of 
the  railway  heavy  artillery,  is  put  under  the  orders  of  the  com- 
mander of  the  divisional  artillery.    For  the  Germans,  therefore, 
counter  battery  is  a  divisional  work,  the  application  of  which 
is  strictly  limited  to  the  narrow  front  of  the  division. 

This  organization  is  very  inferior  to  the  French  system,  which 
concentrates  counter-battery  work  in  the  hands  of  the  army  and 
the  army  corps  and  thus  permits  elastic  use  of  the  great  range 
of  the  guns  by  lateral  actions. 

2.  As  the  result  of  prolonged  artillery  preparation,  the  Ger- 
man infantry  leaves  its  trenches  and  the  reserves  abandon  their 
assembling  places.     This  procedure,  which  destroys  the  cohe- 
sion of  the  first-line  and  counter-attacking  units,  will  not  even 
succeed  in  forcing  the  German  troops  from  the  French  artillery 
fire  if  our  artillery  executes  zone  fire  with  time-fuse  shells  (see 
note  28,610,  of  August  25,  and  note  1,606,  of  September  2,  of  the 
general  commanding  in  chief)  and  with  gas  shells. 

To  escape  destruction  by  the  French  batteries,  the  German 
artillery  takes  positions  in  the  open.  The  artillery  intelligence 
service  must  give  the  greatest  care  to  making  sure  where  the 
German  battery  emplacements  are  and  when  they  are  not  actu- 
ally occupied,  and  must  regulate  counter-battery  fire  accordingly. 
If  this  is  neglected,  the  French  artillery  will  waste  its  fire  on 
a  great  number  of  empty  emplacements  and  will  thus  play  into 
the  enemy's  hand. 

THE  GERMAN  ARTILLERY  IN  LINE  ON  BOTH  BANKS  OF  THE 
MEUSE,  AUGUST  20,  1917. 

[Investigation  made  by  the  Second  Army.] 

Information  collected  confirms  in  a  general  way  the  facts 
already  known  relative  to  the  organization  of  the  command, 
the  density  and  the  disposition  of  the  enemy  artillery  in  a  de- 
fensive sector. 

3127&0— 18 4  25 


26  GERMAN  NOTES   ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 

I.  ORGANIZATION   OF  THE  COMMAND. 

(a)  All  artillery  in  position,  with  the  apparent  exception  of 
the  railway  heavy  artillery,1  is  at  the  disposal  of  the  infantry 
division,  and  is  placed  under  the  orders  of  the  commander  of  the 
divisional  artillery.3 

In  the  "  Maasswestgruppe  "  (group  west  of  the  Maass)  at  the 
beginning  of  August  there  were  directly  dependent  on  the  army 
corps  staff  only  some  units  of  artillery  not  yet  in  battery ;  a 
foot  artillery  staff  (apparently  as  reserve  command)  ;  a  staff 
"  for  special  employment "  (the  foot  artillery  regimental  staff 
for  special  employment  No.  1). 

(b)  Within  the  divisions  the  distribution  is  variable. 

In  the  "  Maasswestgruppe  "  the  artillery  was  divided  within 
each  division  into  two  great  groups — the  long-range  group 
("Fernkampfgruppe"),  under  the  orders  of  a  foot  artillery 
regimental  staff,  and  the  short-range  group  ("Nahkampf- 
grnppe"),  under  the  orders  of  the  commander  of  the  regiment 
attached  to  the  division. 

The  "  Fernkampfgruppe "  comprised  the  larger  part  of  the 
foot  artillery  guns  and  howitzers.  Its  essential  mission  is  coun- 
ter-battery and  long-range  harassing  fire,  and  it  also  participates 
in  fire  for  annihilation. 

The  "  Nahkamptgruppe  "  was  formed  by  all  the  field  artillery 
at  the  disposal  of  the  divisional  artillery  (the  attached  regiment 
and  reinforcing  battalions),  and  also  included  some  batteries  of 
heavy  artillery  (a  large  proportion  of  sector  batteries). 

ESSENTIAL  MISSION BAKBAGE  AND  "  ANNIHILATING  "  FIRE. 

These  two  groups  in  turn  were  divided  into  subgroups,  of 
which  the  "  Fernkampfgruppe  "  comprised  two  and  the  "  Nah- 
kampfgruppe"  comprised  two  or  three,  all  placed  under  the 
orders  of  a  field  artillery  group  commander  or  of  a  foot  artillery 

1  Seven  or  eight  railway  batteries  had  been  located  by  the  artillery 
intelligence  service  of  the  army.     None  of  these  batteries  figures  in  the 
tables  of  divisional  artillery  which  have  fallen  into  our  hands. 

2  Numbers  of  the  "  divisional  artillery  commands  "  noted :  25th  Re- 
serve Division,  228th  Division,  206th  Reserve  Division,  213th  Division, 
6th  Reserve  Division,  127th  Divisional  Artillery  Command,  228th  Divi- 
sional Artillery  Command,  206th  Divisional  Artillery  Command,  213th 
Divisional  Artillery  Command,  94th  Divisional  Artillery  Command. 


GERMAN  NOTES   ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 


27 


battalion  commander  and  comprising  a  variable  number  of  bat- 
teries.1 

In  the  "  Maasstosstgruppe "  (group  east  of  the  Maass)  the 
field  artillery  seems  to  have  been  placed  entirely  under  the 
orders  of  the  commander  of  the  regiment  attached  to  the  di- 
vision, the  heavy  artillery  forming  a  "  foot  artillery  regiment." 

II.  DENSITY  OF  THE  ENEMY  ARTILLERY  IN  LINE. 

(a)  It  has  been  possible  to  ascertain  the  whole  composition  of 
the  enemy  artillery  at  the  disposal  of  the  three  infantry  divi- 
sions of  the  left  bank  and  of  one  of  the  infantry  divisions  of  the 
right  bank  (Two  hundred  and  twenty-eighth  Division,  Beau- 
mont sector,  Bois  des  Fosses),  as  it  was  at  the  end  of  July  and 
beginning  of  August. 


Division. 

Number  of  batteries. 

Front  held  by  divisions. 

1  Number  of  batteries  per  kilo- 
meter. 

Field 
Artil- 
lery. 

Heavy  Artillery. 

. 

Guns. 

Heavy  howitzers. 

Mortars. 

I 

>> 

1 

1 
1 

P 

7.7  cm. 

10.5  cm. 

§ 

O) 

0 

CO 

w 

5 

o 

JO 

Two  hundred  and  sixth 
Division 

14 
1 

1 

8  1 

1 

5 

9 

2 
6 
4 

5 

"> 

fi 

4 

1 

35 

28 
31 

29 

Km. 
3 

2 
23.5 

2.8 

11.7 

14 
9 

10 

Two  hundred  and  thir- 
teenth Division  
Sixth  Reserve  Division. 
Two     hundred    and 
Twenty-eighth  Divi- 
sion 

.... 
1 

2 

4 

4 

.... 
1 

2 
2 

4 
6 

8 

2 
3 

6 

1(In  the  Sixth  Reserve  Division  the  distribution  was  as  follows: 
(a)    SHOUT-UANGE  (^UOUP  : 

West  subgroup. — One  77-mm.  battery ;  one  9-cm.  battery  ;  two 
105-mm.  howitzer  batteries ;  one  15-cm.  howitzer  battery ; 
one  12-cm.  battery. 

Center  subgroup. — Three  77-mm.  batteries';  two  105-mm.  how- 
itzer batteries;  one  battery  of   15-cm.   Russian   guns. 
East  subgroup. — Four  77-mm.  batteries ;  two  105-mm.  howitzer 

batteries ;  one  15-cm.  howitzer  battery. 
(6)   LONG-RANGE  GROUP: 

Subgroup    A. — Two    15-cm.    howitzer    batteries ;    two    21-cm. 
mortar  batteries ;  one  10-cm.  battery ;  one  battery  of  Krupp 
15-cm.    guns. 
Subgroup    B. — Two    15-cm.     howitzer    batteries ;    one    21-cm. 

mortar  battery;   three   10-cm.   batteries.) 

2  No  account  is  taken  of  the  passive  sector  included  between  the  railroad  and  the 
Meuse, 


28  GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 

For  the  four  divisions  investigated,  therefore,  the  average 
density  about  August  1  would  be  a  little  less  than  11  batteries 
per  kilometer. 

The  proportion  of  guns  to  howitzers  and  mortars  was  much 
higher  than  normal — 21  heavy-artillery-gun  batteries  against  33 
batteries  of  howitzers  and  mortars,  or  nearly  39  per  cent  of  the 
total  (normal  proportion,  27  per  cent). 

(&)  It  is  difficult  to  ascertain  the  precise  reenforcement  made 
l>y  the  enemy  from  August  1  to  20.  According  to  the  declara- 
tions of  prisoners  and  documents  which  have  fallen  into  our 
hands,  it  seems  to  have  been  relatively  small  on  the  left  bank, 
where  the  enemy  had  already  been  induced,  as  a  result  of  the 
battles  of  late  June  and  of  the  month  of  July,  to  assemble  a 
considerable  mass  of  artillery.  On  the  right  bank  it  was  more 
important,  as  several  battalions  of  foot  artillery  arrived  there 
during  the  first  two  weeks  of  August  (the  Sixty-sixth  and  Sev- 
enty-eighth Battalions  of  foot  artillery). 

It  is  also  possible  that  part  of  the  divisional  artillery  of  the 
four  divisions  in  reserve  may  have  been  put  in  line;1  at  least 
it  is  certain  that  this  artillery  was  in  the  immediate  rear  of  the 
front  ready  to  enter  into  action  on  the  very  day  of  the  attack. 

(c)  The  mass  of  artillery  thus  assembled  by  the  enemy  was 
constituted  as  follows: 

Field  artillery. — Each  division  had  at  its  disposal,  in  addition 
to  its  attached  regiment,  from  six  to  nine  batteries  from  an  inde- 
pendent regiment.2 

Foot  artillery. — During  a  quiet  period  (north  front  of  Verdun, 
in  April  and  May)  each  division  disposed  of  eight  or  nine  bat- 
teries, largely  belonging  to  Landwehr  battalions  or  to  position 
batteries.  The  reenforcement  was  made  by  means  of  newly- 
formed  battalions  withdrawn  from  the  sectors  of  battles  of  last 
spring,  the  Aisne  and  Champagne. 

1  In  total,  the  artillery  at  the  disposal  of  the  divisions  which  under- 
went our  attack  can  be  estimated  to  have  been  on  August  20  about  180 
or  ZOO  batteries,  which  would  conespond  to  an  average  density  of  12 
or  13  batteries  per  kilometer. 

To  have  an  idea  of  the  artillery  participating  in  the  battle  there 
should  be  added  to  this  total  seven  or  eight  pieces  of  high-powered 
heavy  artillery  not  dependent  on  the  infantry  divisions  (report  of  the 
artillery  intelligence  service)  and  numerous  batteries  belonging  to  the 
adjoining  divisions  and  acting  on  the  flanks  of  our  attack. 

3  Independent  regiments  identified  on  the  front  of  attack :  Left  bank, 
Fourth  Bavarian  and  Two  Hundred  and  Sixty-sixth  Foot  Artillery  Regi- 
ments ;  right  bank,  Twenty-eighth  Reserve  and  Twenty-fourth  Reserve 
Foot  Artillery  Regiments, 


GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS.  29 

III.  DISTRIBUTION   OF  THE  ARTILLERY  ON   THE   GROUND, 

Several  documents  which  have  fallen  into  our  hands  indicate, 
for  several  divisional  sectors,  the  arrangement  of  the  artillery 
at  different  periods,  one  of  which  corresponds  to  a  period  of 
inactivity  (Seventh  Reserve  Division,  in  April,  1917),  and  the 
others  to  different  moments  of  the  enemy  reenforcement  (Sixth 
Reserve  Division,  at  the  beginning  of  July,  Twenty-ninth  Divi- 
sion about  August  1). 

Examination  of  these  documents  suggests  the  following  re- 
marks : 

1.  In  a  quiet  period  each  battery  of  heavy  artillery  has  at  its 
disposal  at  least  one  alternative  emplacement.    There  are  also 
a  considerable  number  of  reenforcement  emplacements. 

In  case,  of  the  Seventh  Reserve  Division,  for  18  batteries  exist- 
ing in  April  in  its  sector  reenforcement  by  12  batteries  was  con- 
templated1 and  emplacements  for  them  were  in  course  of  con- 
struction. 

2.  In  all  the  sectors  studied  the  larger  part  of  the  enemy  artil- 
lery is  in  the  rear  of  the  artillery-protection  position.    Some  bat- 
teries of  all  calibers  are  pushed  forward.     Among  these  it  Is 
interesting  to  note  the  particularly  large  proportion  of  guns 
intended  for  the  execution  of  harassing  fire  on  our  rear. 

In  the  course  of  our  preparation  this  arrangement  was  modi- 
fied and  most  of  the  batteries  of  guns  were  withdrawn  to  the 
rear  of  the  second  position. 

3.  The  enemy  had  organized  in  great  detail  for  defense  against 
tanks.2    In  each  sector  several  90-mm.  pieces  taken  from  position 
batteries  and  77-mm.  pieces  detailed  from  batteries  in  the  sector 
were  pushed  forward  and  made  responsible  solely  for  combating 
tanks  or  for  fire  against  the  infantry  at  the  moment  of  the 
assault. 

In  the  course  of  our  preparation  all  these  pieces  were  ren- 
dered incapable  of  intervening. 

1  The  total  of  30  batteries  thus  contemplated  corresponds  exactly  to 
the   density  recommended   in   the   German   regulations  of  March    1   on 
"  the   principles   of   defensive   battle    in   trench   warfare "    and   to   the 
actual  density  at  the  moment  of  our  attack   (see  above). 

2  The  Germans  seem  to  have  had  a  strong  idea  of  the  possible  par- 
ticipation of  tanks  in  our  attack.     Besides  the  artillery  defense,  cuts 
had  been  made  in  all  roads  perpendicular  to  the  front. 


30  GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 

CONCLUSIONS. 

I.  The  numerical  conclusions  which  we  have  reached  in  regard 
to  the  number  of  enemy  batteries  in  line  are  considerably  lower 
than  the  figures  obtained  by  the  artillery  intelligence  service. 
The  reasons  for  this  difference  may  be  found  in  the  more  and 
more  frequent  changes  of  position  by  batteries,  even  in  course 
of  battle.    According  to  the  declarations  of  prisoners,  the  coun- 
ter-battered batteries  have  first  moved  to  their  alternative  em- 
placements, and  when  they  were  fired  on  the  batteries  have 
moved  out  into  the  open  and  thereby  escaped  any  further  losses 
from  our  counter  battery. 

II.  To  summarize,  the  enemy  having  sure  knowledge  as  early 
as  the  end  of  July  of  our  projected  attacks,  reenforced,  deployed, 
and  utilized  his  artillery  exactly  in  accordance  with  the  rules 
laid  down  by  him  in  March,  1917,  in  his  "  Principles  of  Defensive 
Battle  in  Position  Warfare." 

This  artillery,  located  with  precision  by  us  and  energetically 
counter  battered,  is  admitted  by  officer  prisoners  to  have  found 
it  impossible  to  carry  out  the  role  expected  of  it.  It  is  possible, 
therefore,  that  the  enemy,  if  he  has  the  means,  will  in  future 
increase  the  density  of  artillery  which  he  had  planned  for  de- 
fensive battle.  We  must  also  expect  to  see  him  endeavor  to 
diminish  his  losses  by  more  and  more  frequent  changes  of  posi- 
tion, even  going  so  far  as  to  put  batteries  in  the  open  outside 
any  prepared  epaulernent. 


THE  TRANSMISSION  OF  INTELLIGENCE  IN  THE 
GERMAN  ARMY. 


A  German  document  of  January  1,  1917  (Fifth  Army :  "  Memo- 
randum on  the  transmission  of  intelligence,"  signed  V.  Gallwitz), 
furnishes  valuable  information  on  this  important  point. 

The  thing  to  be  noted  is  the  eminently  defensive  character 
of  the  document.  The  liaison  service  is  mainly  utilized  for  the 
purpose  of  transmitting  intelligence  so  as  to  assure,  at  the  op- 
portune time,  the  action  of  the  artillery  and  the  execution  of 
counter  attacks.  The  transmission  of  orders  and  the  organiza- 
tion of  liaisons  in  conquered  ground  are  not  even  contemplated. 
It  is  probable  that  this  document  was  written  under  the  direct 
impression  of  the  French  attacks  at  the  end  of  1916.  The  "  In- 
struction for  the  General  Organization  of  Divisional  Intelligence 
Service,"  which  is  dated  March,  1917,  has  the  same  strictly 
defensive  character. 

I.  GENERAL  REGULATIONS. 

The  "  memorandum  "  lays  down  the  following  principles : 

"  Both  the  general  direction  of  operations  and  the  coordina- 
tion of  the  different  arms  of  the  service  depend  on  the  transmis- 
sion of  intelligence. 

"  Each  process  of  transmission  forms  part  of  a  definite  whole. 
The  cooperation  of  all  must  be  assured  by  direct  or  lateral 
liaisons. 

"As  the  first  position  is  that  most  often  destroyed  by  the 
enemy  fire,  prepare  in  advance  a  plan  for  the  reorganization 
of  the  liaison  service  at  points  chosen  both  in  the  open  ground 
and  in  the  second  and  third  positions. 

"  Improvise  numerous  surprise  drills,  assuming  the  loss  of 
one  or  more  positions.  If  possible,  each  regiment  should  be 
drilled  every  day,  the  tactical  situation  being  changed  each 
time. 

"  From  the  first  lines  to  the  regiment,  only  terms  agreed  upon 
must  be  used. 

"  During  combat  it  may  be  advisable  to  send  an  officer  to  the 
immediately  inferior  unit. 

31 


32  GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 

"  During  attacks  the  assaulting  infantry  should  be  accom- 
panied by  an  artillery  officer  with  signal  material. 

"  During  reliefs  the  personnel  of  the  intelligence  service  must 
not  leave  the  sector  until  it  has  fully  informed  the  relieving 
personnel. 

"Active  liaison  between  the  infantry  and  the  artillery  officers. 

"  Do  not  post  artillery  observers  with  infantry  except  at  points 
where  the  view  is  good  and  where  sufficient  liaison  with  the  rear 
is  assured. 

"At  rest  and  in  a  sector,  habituate  the  troops  to  the  regular 
utilization  of  the  processes  of  transmitting  intelligence.  Espe- 
cially instruct  the  infantry  and  artillery  observers.  The  troops 
should  know  these  different  processes  in  order  that  if  one  fails 
they  may  use  another. 

"  It  is  advisable  to  initiate  the  divisional  cavalry  in  the  tele- 
phone and  signal  services. 

"  The  instruction  will  be  given  by  the  telephone  detachments. 

"  The  men  who  are  sufficiently  intelligent  should  know  the 
Morse  code.  Numerous  Morse  alphabets  should  be  posted  in  the 
cantonments. 

"All  noncommissioned  officers,  whatever  the  situation,  should 
incessantly  try  to  find  new  processes  for  assuring  the  liaison 
between  the  first  line  and  the  nearest  sure  telephone  post.  Sug- 
gestions should  be  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  Army." 

II.  MEANS  OF  LIAISON. 

A.  TELEPHONE. 

The  division  commander  and  the  commander  of  the  divisional 
artillery  should  be  in  the  same  locality.  The  staff  lines  will  be 
established  only  for  messages  and  conversations  of  a  tactical 
order.  Be  sparing  of  material. 

B.  T.  P.  S.   (EARTH-CONDUCTION  TELEGRAPHY). 

The  memorandum  considers  that  this  means  of  liaison  is  not 
yet  sufficiently  tested  for  the  transmission  of  messages. 

C.  INFANTRY  AIRPLANE. 

(a)  Instruction. — The  memorandum  insists  on  the  instruction 
of  the  troops.  It  prescribes : 

First.  Drills  with  panels,  newspapers,  Bengal  lights,  wireless 
telegraphy,  sirens,  machine-gun  fire,  visual  signals,  etc. 


GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS.  33 

Second.  Lectures  illustrated  with  slides. 

Third.  Detailed  discussions  with  the  troops,  either  at  the 
aviation  camp  or  at  the  cantonment. 

Fourth.  Courses  of  instruction  for  officers,  noncommissioned 
officers,  and  men. 

The  memorandum  adds : 

"  The  infantry  airplane  should  appear  every  day,  weather 
permitting,  over  the  infantry  first  lines  and  try  some  process 
of  liaison. 

"  Repeat  the  signals  to  the  troops  until  they  signal  '  Under- 
stood.' " 

(&)  Organization  of  the  liaison. — The  army  corps  should  dis- 
tribute the  infantry  airplanes  among  the  divisions  and  organize 
conferences  between  the  chiefs  of  wireless-telegraphy  sections, 
of  telephone  sections,  of  the  groups  of  infantry  airplanes,  and 
an  officer  of  the  staff  of  the  general  commanding  the  artillery. 

The  infantry  divisions  should,  the  moment  an  infantry  air- 
plane goes  up,  advise  the  interested  sectors  in  order :  First,  that 
all  may  be  ready  to  display  the  panels  and  to  send  the  visual 
signals;  second,  that  the  wireless-telegraphy  stations  may  re- 
ceive the  waves  exactly. 

Later  the  infantry  divisions  advise  when  the  airplane  has 
returned. 

If  telephonic  communications  are  broken,  the  infantry 
divisions  will  assign  fixed  hours  for  liaison  by  infantry  air- 
planes. 

D.  PANELS  OF  WHITE  CLOTH. 

Dimensions:  0.60  by  1.20  meters.  Intervals:  From  10  to  20 
meters. 

Make  signals  in  Morse  code  with  panels  which  are  white  on 
one  side  and  dark  on  the  other. 

E.  GABBIER  PIGEONS. 

The  "  memorandum  "  considers  that  their  efficacy  is  limited 
(fog,  obscure  weather,  varying  results  from  different  pigeons). 


F.  RUN  NEBS. 


Very  strict  organization. 
31279°— 18 5 


34  GERMAN  NOTES   ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 

G.  INTELLIGENCE  COLLECTION  STATIONS    ("  MELDESAMMEL- 

STELLEN  " )  .  . 

They  receive  the  duplicate  of  every  intelligence  report  so 
that  any  that  do  not  reach  their  destination  may  be  made  known 
promptly.  The  troops  should  know  the  emplacement  of  these 
stations.  Choose  emplacements  near  a  road  and  connect  the 
station  to  the  telephone  by  horsemen,  cyclists,  automobiles, 
runners. 

H.  OBSERVATION  POSTS  INSIDE  THE  LINES. 

"  Particularly  important,"  says  the  "  memorandum,"  "  is  ob- 
servation in  the  rear  lines  of  the  first  position,  in  the  second  or 
third  positions,  or  near  them."  Such  observations  often  give 
indications  essential  for  counter  attacks  when  the  enemy  has 
momentarily  penetrated  the  first  line. 

TRANSMISSION  OF  SIGNALS  FOR  BARRAGE  FIRE. 

The  "  memorandum  "  outlines  a  scheme  for  liaison  service  on 
the  appearance  of  an  enemy  airplane.  It  recommends  the  in- 
stallation at  observation  posts  of  orientation  tables  to  permit 
specific  report  of  the  place  for  which  barrage  fire  is  requested. 

The  scheme  is  as  follows : 

1.  In  each  corps  the  troops,  the  antiaircraft  guns,  the  air- 
plane-locating section  notify  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  antiair- 
craft defense  of  the  corps. 

2.  The  officers  of  the  antiaircraft  defense  thereupon  notify  the 
aviation  intelligence  collection  center  of  the  group. 

3.  The  latter  notifies  the  pursuit  squadron,  the  commander 
of  the  aviation  groups,  and  the  battle  squadron. 

Each  airplane  should  be  signaled  separately,  as  a  general  mes- 
sage arrives  too  late. 

The  "  memorandum  "  concludes  as  follows : 

"Thanks  to  the  various  processes  of  transmitting  intelligence, 
the  high  command  and  the  artillery,  even  on  days  of  great  bat- 
tles, can  in  one  way  or  another  be  in  liaison  with  the  regiments, 
often  with  the  battalion  commanders,  and  also,  in  spite  of  inter- 
ruptions, with  the  advanced  lines  of  the  infantry. 

"  Generals  commanding  army  corps  will  use  these  suggestions 
to  try  out  the  dispositions  taken  for  the  transmission  of  intelli- 
gence, will  improve  on  them,  and  multiply  them  constantly,  and 
will  stimulate  the  divisions  by  frequent  drills.  The  absence  of 
intelligence  reports  during  the  course  of  a  battle  is  generally  to 
be  ascribed  to  IncK  of  organization  or  to  insufficient  supervision." 


GERMAN  ATTACK  BY  GAS  WAVES  WHICH  WAS  TO 
HAVE  TAKEN  PLACE  IN  CHAMPAGNE  IN  SEPTEM- 
BER, 1917. 


The  Germans  last  August  had  prepared  a  gas-wave  attack  as 
a  preliminary  to  the  infantry  attack  west  of  Souain  Hill.  It  Is 
now  known  that  we  forestalled  this  attack. 

In  the  course  of  our  surprise  attacks,  particularly  that  of 
September  3  on  the  Navarin  farm,  we  captured  orders  and  docu- 
ments and  took  prisoners  who  furnished  important  information 
concerning  the  preparations  for  this  attack. 

The  attention  of  the  armies  is  called  to  this  information,  for 
it  is  to  be  expected  that  the  Germans  will  not  abandon  their 
project,  but  will  attempt  to  carry  out  on  some  other  front  the 
operation  which  failed  in  Champagne. 

I.   ANALYSIS  OF  THE   FILES   OF  THE  FIRST  BAVARIAN   DIVISION 
RELATING  TO  THE  ATTACK  BY  GAS  WAVES. 

The  operation  was  to  have  been  carried  out  by  the  First 
Bavarian  Division  supported  by  the  two  neighboring  divisions. 
The  front  of  the  First  Bavarian  Division  extended  from  the 
Saint-Hilaire-Saint-Souplet  road  to  Souain  Hill  (6  kilometers). 

ORDERS  Nos.  1,  2,  AND  3  OF  THE  12TH,  13TH,  AND  17TH  OF  AUGUST, 

1917. 

GENERAL  INSTRUCTIONS. 

The  First  Bavarian  Division  will  make  use  of  the  powerful 
effect  of  gas  in  order  to  penetrate  the  enemy  positions  on  the 
entire  divisional  front. 

Troops  employed. — Twelve  shock  troops  of  the  First  Bavarian 
Division,  three  shock  troops  of  the  Second  Assault  Battalion, 
twelve  salvage  squads,  twelve  destruction  squads  (see  the  com- 
position on  pages  37  and  38). 

Attack  on  the  flank. — The  attack  of  the  First  Bavarian  Divi- 
sion will  be  flanked  by  attacks  of  shock  troops  from  the  two 

35 


36  GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 

neighboring  divisions  (the  Thirtieth  Division  on  the  west  and 
the  Fifty-fourth  Reserve  Division  on  the  east). 

Mission. — To  destroy  the  enemy  defenses  on  as  wide  a  front 
as  possible ;  to  bring  back  the  greatest  possible  quantity  of  war 
material  of  all  kinds,  as  well  as  documents.  In  the  orders  the 
operation  is  called  Sommerernte  (summer  harvest)  ;  to  deter- 
mine the  losses  of  the  enemy. 

The  occupation  of  the  position.— The  original  plan  provided 
for  a  wide  outflanking  attack  to  capture  and  occupy  territory. 

The  menace  of  our  attack  on  the  Verdun  front  obliged  the 
Germans  to  withdraw  the  Thirtieth  Division  and  the  Fifty- 
fourth  Reserve  Division.  In  replacing  them  the  enemy  could 
dispose  only  of  divisions  which  had  already  suffered  severely  in 
Flanders,  the  Two  Hundred  and  Twenty-first  and  the  Fifty- 
second  Reserve  Divisions. 

Under  these  conditions  the  German  commander  reduced  the 
scope  of  his  plan  (order  of  the  17th  of  August).  After- the  gas 
emission  the  extent  of  the  effect  was  to  be  observed,  the  destruc- 
tion completed,  and  the  greatest  possible  quantity  of  booty 
brought  back ;  but  there  was  to  be  no  question  of  gaming  ter- 
ritory. 

Front  and  objective. — The  line  to  be  attained  formed  an  arc 
the  chord  of  which  was  approximately  9  kilometers  (from  a  point 
2  kilometers  east  of  Auberive  to  the  Souain  Hill)  and  3  kilome- 
ters deep  (1  kilometer  west-southwest  of  Souain).  The  order 
of  the  17th  of  August  provided  that  three  shock  troops  would 
push  beyond  the  line  originally  fixed,  and  have  for  their  respec- 
tive objectives  Saint-Hilaire,  the  Vacques  farm,  and  Souain. 

Prospective  date. — The  cylinders  were  to  be  in  position  by 
August  15.1  The  emission  was  to  take  place,  at  the  earliest, 
during  the  night  of  the  17th  to  18th,  one  hour  before  daylight 
(order  of  the  12th  of  August).  Owing  to  prevailing  contrary 
winds,  the  order  of  the  17th  of  August  postponed  the  operation 
to  the  1st  of  September  (at  the  earliest). 

Evacuation  of  the  trenches. — The  advanced  trendies  were  to 
be  evacuated  for  the  attack,  and  only  pioneer  gasers  (Thirty- 
fifth  Regiment  Pioneers),  the  sanitary  personnel,  and  holding 
garrison  were  to  remain  in  them. 

M  iimte  detailed  instructions  were  given  concerning  the  assem- 
bling of  the  shock  troops  and  the  different  squads.  All  orders 
were  given  by  code-conventional  words. 

i  The  Thirty-fifth  and  Thirty-sixth  Resimonts  of  Pioneers  seem  to 
have  arrived  on  the  sector  the  beginning  of  July. 


GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS.  37 

Emission — Crossing  Ihe  trenches. — The  emission  will  last  15 
minutes.  Six  companies  of  the  Thirty-fifth  Pioneer  Regiment 
will  be  distributed  along  the  emission  sector.  If  it  is  dangerous 
for  the  shock  troops  to  cross  the  emission  trenches  at  the  ap- 
pointed hour,  the  commanders  of  pioneer  companies  will  either 
detain  them  or  point  out  a  safe  route  to  them. 

Use  of  the  artillery  and  trench  mortars. — During  the  entire 
operation  the  enemy  artillery  will  be  neutralized  by  the  fire 
of  shell  and  gas  shell.  In  each  regimental  sector  a  platoon  of 
field  artillery  will  advance  as  far  forward  as  possible  for  the 
immediate  support  of  the  shock  troops  during  the  advance.  The 
divisional  artillery  will  hold  itself  in  readiness  to  execute,  on 
request  from  the  shock  troops,  a  barrage  fire  in  front  of  the  ob- 
jective assigned.  The  trench  mortars,  medium  and  light,  of 
the  divisional  company  will  be  employed  to  support  the  attack 
and  to  reduce  isolated  points  of  resistance. 

Aviation. — Three  infantry  aeroplanes  and  one  or  two  artillery 
aeroplanes  wrill  be  employed  in  the  attack. 

Preliminaries. — Special  instructions  to  the  shock  troops  and 
squads.  Detailed  reconnaissance.  Special  organization  of  liai- 
son. Partial  rehearsal  of  the  operation  during  the  night  of  the 
16th  to  the  17th. 

COMPOSITION   OF  THE   SHOCK  TROOPS  AND  DETACHMENTS. 

(a)  Shock  troops. — The  First  Bavarian  Division  will  form  12 
shock  troops,  Nos.  1-12  (4  per  infantry  regiment),  and  the 
Second  Assault  Battalion  will  furnish  3  (A,  B,  C),  making  a 
total  of  15  shock  troops. 

troops   1  to  12. 


Furnished  by  the  infantry. 


1  officer. 

3  noncommissioned  officers. 

16  men. 

1  light  machine  gun  (5  men). 

2  signalers. 

1  noncommissioned  officer,  4  miners,  First  Battalion  of  Pioneers. 

3  pioneer  gasers  from  the  Thirty-fifth  Regiment. 

1  corporal  and  3  miners.  iFrom     Assault     Battalion 

1  corporal  and  6  grenade  throwers.  J     No.  2. 

2  stretcher  bearers. 

Total,  1  officer  and  47  noncommissioned  officers  and  men. 


38  GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 

Shock  troops  Nos.  2,  7,  and  10  will  be  known  as  the  principal 
shock  troops.  They  will  have,  in  addition  to  the  above,  an  artil- 
lery patrol  (1  officer  and  5  men,  including  2  telephone  operators 
and  2  signalers),  one  detachment  of  infantry  telephone  oper- 
ators (1  noncommissioned  officer  and  3  men),  one  supplementary 
detachment  of  visual  signalers  (2  men),  and  one  pigeon  tender, 
making  an  additional  force  of  1  officer  and  12  noncommissioned 
officers  and  men. 

Shock  troops  A,  B,  C. 

1  officer.  1 

30  men.  iFrom  Assault  Battalion  No.  2. 

1  light  machine  gun  (5  men),  j 

2  officers  or  warrant  officers.  1 

12  gunners  and  2  light  trench  mortars.  I  From  the  infantry  trench- 
4  telephone  operators.  [     mortar  detachments. 

2  stretcher  bearers. 

Total,  3  officers  and  51  men. 

(b)  Destruction  and  salvage  squads. — The  First  Bavarian 
Division  will  form  12  salvage  squads,  Nos.  1  to  12  (4  per  in- 
fantry regiment),  and  the  First  Pioneer  Battalion  12  destruc- 
tion squads,  1  to  12. 

Total  strength  of  the  Milnif/c.  and  destruction  squads. 

1  warrant  officer. 

3  noncommissioned  officers. 
21  men. 

1  noncommissioned  officer. 

4  pioneers. 


Infantry. 


Pioneers. 


3  pioneer  gasers. 

Total,  1  warrant  officer  and  32  noncommissioned  officers 
and  men. 

Twelve  men  of  each  salvage  squad  will  carry  the  ammunition 
for  the  light  trench  mortars  of  shock  troops  A,  B,  C. 

(c)  Limber  detachments  (for  removing  enemy  guns). — Three 
limber  detachments  will  be  constituted,  each  comprising  1  officer, 

4  six-horse  teams,  with  the  necessary  drivers  and  gunners,  and, 
in  addition,  1  officer  and  50  men  of  the  pioneer  battalion  with 
entrenching  material  and  explosives. 


GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS.  39 

DETAILS  OF  EXECUTION   OF  THE  OPERATION. 

The  forces  intrusted  with  the  operation  will  be  arranged  for 
the  attack  in  the  following  order : 

(a)   Shock  troops  1  to  12  (first  wave). 

(6)   Shock  troops  A,  B,  C  (second  wave). 

(c)   Salvage  and  destruction  squads  (third  wave). 

The  principal  shock  troops  (2,  7,  and  10)  will  regulate  the 
progress  of  the  others. 

The  role  of  the  shock  troops  will  be  to  open  a  passage  through 
the  enemy's  positions  for  the  salvage  and  destruction  squads,  to 
break  down  the  remaining  resistance,  to  attain  the  objectives 
assigned  them,  and  to  protect  the  salvage  and  destruction  squads 
during  their  operations. 

If  the  shock  troops  attain  their  objectives  and  no  enemy  at- 
tacks occur  during  the  day,  the  troops  shall  remain  in  the  con- 
quered lines  until  dark. 

If  the  shock  troops  encounter  a  strong  resistance,  which  they 
do  not  succeed  in  breaking  down,  they  will  hold  out  until  the 
search  for  and  seizure  of  the  booty  has  been  completed. 

Before  a  superigr  enemy  attack  the  shock  troops  will  fall  back 
slowly,  protected  by  a  barrage  fire,  which  they  will  ask  for. 

The  patrols  of  artillery  officers  marching  with  shock  troops 
2,  7,  and  10  will  support  the  advance  by  directing  the  fire  of  the 
advanced  artillery  platoons. 

Shock  troops  A,  B,  and  C,  marching  with  the  second  wave,  will 
support  those  who  advanced  with  the  first  wave,  breaking  the 
enemy  resistance  as  much  as  possible  by  flanking  movements. 
They  will  put  their  trench  mortars  into  action  rapidly. 

The  salvage  squads  will  explore  the  captured  trenches.  If  the 
advance  continues,  they  will  organize  a  depot  to  which  the  com- 
panies in  position  will  send  their  fatigue  parties  to  transport 
important  materiel  to  the  rear. 

All  arms,  appliances,  telephones,  listening  apparatus,  field 
glasses,  searchlights,  maps,  orders,  documents,  equipment,  and 
gas  mask's  will  be  collected. 

Enemies  overcome  \)y  the  gas  fumes  will  be  brought  into  our 
lines. 

The  role  of  the  sappers-gasers  operating  with  the  shock  troops 
and  squads  is  to  point  out  the  passages  free  from  gas  and  to  warn 
the  men  against  the  danger  of  being  overcome. 


40  GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 

The  destruction  squads,  after  removing  the  booty,  will  de- 
stroy the  principal  enemy  defenses  (command  posts,  observation 
stations,  shelters,  etc.). 

Aviation. — The  infantry  aeroplanes  will  hold  themselves  in 
liaison  with  the  shock  troops  and  will  keep  the  regimental  com- 
manders and  the  divisional  commander  informed  of  the  advance 
of  the  shock  troops. 

Should  a  counter  attack  menace  the  shock  troops,  the  aero- 
planes will  give  warning  by  machine-gun  fire. 

Liaison. — The  liaisons  will  be  organized  in  every  detail,  in 
order  that  the  regimental  and  brigade  commanders  and  the  divi- 
sional commander  may  be  kept  informed  of  the  advance  of 
the  shock  troops.  Liaison  on  the  flanks  will  be  constantly  main- 
tained. Only  the  principal  shock  troops  (2,  7,  and  10)  will 
communicate  with  the  rear.  The  others  will  maintain  lateral 
liaison  only. 

The  principal  shock  troops  will  dispose  of  the  following  means : 

Telephone. — Six  kilometers  of  wire  and  3  telephones. 

Visual  signaling. — Three  groups  of  signalers  (1  for  the  rear, 
1  for  lateral  liaison,  and  1  for  the  artillery ) . 

Pigeons. — Four  pigeons. 

Wireless. — Shock  troop  No.  7  will  be  accompanied  by  a  group 
of  wireless  operators. 

Rockets  will  only  be  used  in  requesting  barrage  fire  or  exten- 
sion of  fire. 

All  the  shock  troops  will  designate  runners  for  use  in  case  the 
other  means  of  communication  should  fail. 

ORDER  No.  4  OF  THE  25xn  OF  AUGUST,  1917. 

By  the  21st  the  Germans  knew  that  we  had  discovered  their 
plans.  On  the  entire  front  In  question  our  artillery  began 
demolition  fire  (21st  of  August),  and  our  infantry  multiplied 
its  surprise  attacks,  resulting  each  time  in  the  capture  of  pris- 
oners and  materiel.  In  order  to  face  our  offensive  at  Verdun, 
the  German  commander  was  obliged  to  call  upon  his  remaining 
available  resources  west  of  the  Argonne. 

Therefore  an  order  dated  August  25  modified  the  arrangement. 
"  Under  the  present  conditions  a  more  energetic  action  on  the 
part  of  the  enemy  must  be  expected  than  was  at  first  antici- 
pated." Consequently— 

The  shock  troops  of  each  regimental  sector  will  be  placed  un- 
der the  orders  of  a  battalion  commander,  who,  with  his  staff, 


GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS.  41 

will  follow  Hie  movements  of  the  principal  shock  troops.  His 
duties  will  be:  To  determine  what  linos  will  be  held,  and  for 
how  long;  to  fix  the  moment  of  withdrawal,  and  to  regulate  the 
advance  ami  the  pm.urossivo  withdrawal. 

Each  battalion  commander  icill  dispose  of  a  platoon  of  at 
least  40  men,  with  two  light  machine  guns,  which  will  constitute  a 
reserve  to  be  called  upon  in  case  of  need,  particularly  to  support 
the  shock  troops  in  case  of  counter  attacks. 

The  rear  liaison  installed  by  the  three  principal  shock  troops 
will  be  at  the  disposal  of  the  three  battalion  commanders. 

All  the  men  of  the  attacking  troops  will  have  leather  masks 
issued  to  them. 

Kach  of  the  three  battalion  staffs  will  have  a  squad  of  six 
men  furnished  with  Dreger  apparatus. 

Shortly  before  the  sortie  of  the  shock  troops  the  trench  mor- 
tars will  direct  an  energetic  fire  on  the  breaches  and  on  such 
machine  guns  as  are  still  capable  of  operating. 

POSTPONEMENT  OF  THE  OPERATION  "SINE  DIE." 

Finally,  on  the  29th  of  August  a  pioneer  of  the  Thirty-fifth 
Regiment  deserted,  bringing  us.  in  addition  to  the  confirmation 
of  a  plan  of  attack,  all  the  technical  details  to  be  desired.  This 
desertion  was  noted,  and  the  Germans  became  aware  that  they 
could  no  longer  count  on  a  surprise  effect.  Moreover,  they  had 
taken  some  prisoners  from  us.  who,  in  all  probability,  informed 
them  of  our  counter  preparations. 

Under  such  conditions  the  operation  threatened  to  lose  a  good 
part  of  its  effectiveness.  The  intensity  of  our  fire  (increased 
since  August  27)  no  longer  permitted  the  enemy  to  attempt  even 
a  restricted  infantry  action,  and  the  gas  receptacles  under  our 
bombardment  became  a  source  of  danger  to  the  Germans,1  a 
danger  which  would  be  increased  by  an  unfavorable  wind.  It 
seemed  certain  that  our  very  deadly  and  very  depressing  fire 
would  not  diminish,  while  our  patrols  continued  to  point  out 
survivin  r  installations. 

There  remained,  then,  but  one  solution  to  the  situation — the 
postponement  of  the  plan  sine  die  and  the  removal  of  all  the 

1  According  to  the  declarations  of  prisoners  captured  on  the  29th  of 
August,  our  artillery  fin-  mused  the  explosion  of  numerous  cylinders 
and  this  resulted  in  casu:iltii'>\  After  the  fire  of  the  niirht  of  the 
lst-2d  all  tin1  cylinders  which  had  been  placed  in  the  first  trench  were 
brought  back  to  the  second. 


42  GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 

materiel  as  soon  as  possible,  so  that  the  enemy  might  be  made 
aware  of  this  through  his  patrols.  On  the  10th  of  September 
the  Germans  seem  to  have  come  to  this  decision. 

To  sum  up,  the  "  Sommerernte  "  seems  to  have  gone  through 
three  phases — 

Postponement  of  a  very  extensive  plan  because  of  atmospheric 
conditions  and  the  menace  of  our  attack  along  the  Verdun  front. 

Reduction  of  the  original  plan  owing  to  the  Verdun  attacks, 
while  still  maintaining  a  less  comprehensive  plan  to  be  carried 
out  as  soon  as  the  wind  should  permit. 

Postponement  sine  die,  if  not  definite  abandonment,  when  all 
hope  of  surprise  has  been  lost  and  the  operation  appeared  more 
costly  than  profitable. 

II.  INFORMATION  EMANATING  FROM  THE  PAPERS  OF  A  DESERTER 
AND  THE  DECLARATIONS  OF  PRISONERS. 

NATURE  OF  THE  GAS. 

The  attack  provided  for  two  emissions,  each  of  a  different 
gas: 

First.  Irritant  gas  (reizgas),  probably  sulphate  of  ethyl 
bichloride,  white  color,  drug-store  smell.  Escapes  under  the 
form  of  a  nontoxic  vapor,  accompanied  by  a  little  liquid,  blue 
and  turning  brown  in  the  air,  very  corrosive.  This  noutoxic 
gas  penetrates  the  masks,  and  by  irritating  the  skin  compels 
their  removal.  Duration  of  the  emission,  four  minutes. 

Second.  Toxic  gas  (kampfgas),  a  gas  already  known,  immedi- 
ately following  the  preceding.  It  was  expected  that  at  this 
moment,  our  men  having  taken  off  their  masks,  will  be  with- 
out protection. 

The  officers  captured  from  the  Second  Army  indicated  an 
.analogous  procedure  for  bombardment  with  poisonous  shells. 

DETAILED  DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  APPARATUS  FOR  EMITTING  IRRITANT 

GAS. 

[Translation  of  a  notebook  taken  on  a  deserter  of  tho  Thirty-fifth  Regi- 
ment of  Pioneers.] 

IRRITANT  GAS    (REIZGAS). 

It  is  contained  in  a  case  consisting  of  two  cylindrical  tin  con- 
tainers 70  centimeters  high,  handle  15  centimeters,  escape  tube 
10  centimeters,  the  reservoir  proper  therefore  being  only  50 
centimeters  high. 


GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS.  43 

The  reservoir  proper  consists  of  the  handle  fastened  at  the 
bottom ;  above  the  handle  the  priming  powder,  ignited  by  a  fuse 
primer  placed  in  the  handle,  igniting  itself  when  the  handle  is 
pulled. 

The  interior  of  the  receiver  is  constructed  as  follows:  Two 
tin  cylinders  (concentric),  the  exterior  cylinder  containing  a 
mass  of  sulphur  and  iron  through  which  run  fuses  that  are  in 
contact  with  the  priming  powder. 


Protecttny 


Fusefcortfs  ofpetytfe/} 


matter 


(Kampfgas) 

Manipulation  of  the  apparatus. 

The  gas  box  being  placed  in  position,  supposing  that  the  gas 
is  to  be  released  at  11  o'clock,  at  5  minutes  to  11  the  men  put 
on  gas  masks,  making  sure  that  they  are  properly  adjusted. 


44  GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 

Then  the  commander  of  the  battery  (20  or  25  cylinders)  gives 
the  signal  to  release  the  gas.  Grasp  between  the  first  finger 
and  thumb  of  the  left  hand  the  point  where  the  priming-powder 
tube  is  screwed  on  and,  having  first  unscrewed  the  stopper  of 
the  escape  neck,  pull  the  fuse  primer.  A  light  whistle  will 
indicate  that  the  priming  powder  has  taken.  On  hearing  this 
whistle,  take  some  earth  and  cover  the  bottom  of  the  box  with 
it,  the  remainder  of  the  box  being  already  covered  with  earth 
except  the  neck. 

Wait  two  or  three  minutes  until  the  heavy  vapors  have 
escaped;  now  open  the  heavy  gas  cylinder  (Beschwerungs- 
flasche;  a  rag  or  any  other  sign  distinguishes  it  from  the 
irritant-gas  cylinders.  The  reason  for  this  proceeding  is  to 
make  the  irritant  gas  (lighter)  trail  nearer  the  level  of  the 
ground,  as  otherwise  it  would  rise  and  do  no  harm  to  the  enemy. 
At  the  end  of  four  minutes  the  irritant-gas  box  is  empty,  and 
then  is  the  time  to  release  the  real  asphyxiating  gas. 

On  releasing  the  irritant  gas  from  the  box,  a  liquid  forms  and 
settles  on  the  rim  of  the  neck.  This  liquid  is  very  dangerous. 
When  removing  the  boxes  after  the  operation,  if  this  liquid 
comes  into  contact  with  hands  and  faces,  the  box  of  chloride  of 
lime  carried  by  everyone  should  be  immediately  employed  and 
the  parts  affected  washed  with  this  chloride  of  lime. 

Placing  the  gas  bottles. 
A 


Coc/c  of  the  Bcxhwcrungsf/aschs. 


GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 


45 


When  the  trench  comprises  a  firing  step,  it  is  entirely  removed. 
The  toxic-gas  cylinders  are  placed  upright,  buried  at  the  bottom 
of  the  trench  to  a  depth  of  10  to  15  centimeters,  and  usually  in 
two  rows.  They  should  be  protected  behind  and  on  top  with 
sandbags — two  rows  of  sandbags  behind  the  cylinders  and  at 
least  four,  preferably  six,  layers  above.  Between  each  pair  of 
layers  of  sandbags  on  top  of  the  cylinders  there  must  be  a  sort 
of  covering  called  by  the  prisoner  "  Salsdecke,"  impregnated 
with  a  salt  intended  to  absorb  the  gas,  which  would  otherwise 
escape  into  the  trench  at  the  time  of  the  emission.  A  spare 
Salsdecke  is  always  kept  in  a  corner  of  the  trench  section  where 
the  cylinders  are.  Should  one  of  the  cylinders  explode  as  the 
result  of  a  bombardment,  the  Salsdecke  is  at  once  thrown  over 
the  bottle  and  absorbs  the  gas.  The  Salsdecke  is  brownish  in 
color,  like  wet  earth. 

At  the  time  of  the  emission  the  sandbags  covering  the  bottles 
are  removed,  the  lead  tubes  are  screwed  to  the  neck ;  they  are 
bound  together  in  sheaves  and  thrown  out  onto  the  parapet  of 
the  trench.  At  the  same  time  the  irritant-gas  cylinders  are  laid 
on  the  parapet.  The  whole  arrangement  before  the  emission 
resembles  a  firing  platform  made  of  sandbags.  Only  the  ends 
of  the  keys  of  the  cylinders  can  be  distinguished,  barely  protrud- 
ing behind  the  bags.  One  of  these  keys  is  marked  with  a  dis- 
tinguishing sign  (a  rag,  for  instance).  It  is  the  one  to  be 
opened  at  the  same  time  as  the  irritant-gas  bottles  in  order  to 
weight  the  latter  down.  This  is  the  "  Besclrsverungsflasche." 

SKETCH  B. — Regulation  arrangement  for  the  future ;  the  bottles  to  be 
set  in  the  trench  wall. 


Tax/c  905  6otf/e5  ^ 

'*r 


46  GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 

But  in  the  future  it  is  ordered  that  the  bottles  be  placed  in  a 
sort  of  niche  in  the  actual  trench  wall.  Only  the  sandbags 
behind  the  bottles  will  project  into  the  trench. 

Probable  duration  of  the  attack. 

Four  minutes  for  the  irritant  gas  and  20  minutes  for  the 
toxic  gas.  The  effect  of  the  toxic  gas  may  be  felt  for  a  depth 
of  6  to  7  kilometers. 

Instruction. 

In  the  rear  depots  the  new  irritant  gas  is  not  yet  known,  and 
the  men  only  know  how  to  handle  the  old  poisonous  gas. 

Masks. 

The  irritant  gas  will  penetrate  the  new  leather  masks.  When 
handling  irritant  gas,  carry  in  addition  individual  oxygen 
bottles. 


PREPARATION  AND  EXECUTION  OF  THE  GERMAN 
ATTACK  ALONG  THE  RIDGE  FROM  THE  MENNE- 
CHET  SIGNAL  STATION  TO  THE  CEPY  FARM. 


NIGHT   OF   AUGUST    9-10,    ACCORDING   TO    STATEMENT    OF   PRISONERS. 

[Extracts  from  investigations  made  by  the  Second  Bureau  of  the  Third 
Army  and  of  the  Eleventh  Army  Corps.] 

Objective. — According  to  the  consistent  statement  of  all  the 
prisoners,  corroborated  by  a  document  found  on  the  person  of 
the  commanding  officer  of  the  Third  Battalion,  Four  Hundred 
and  Fifty-first  Regiment,  the  Germans  wanted  to  seize  the  ridge 
Mennechet  Signal — Hill  124 — Cepy  Farm,  as  far  as  the  western 
military  crest. 

The  plan  required  that  the  Four  Hundred  and  Fifty-first,  to 
which  this  operation  was  assigned,  should  retake  its  former 
trenches  which  it  had  lost  on  the  13th  of  last  April,  gain  enough 
terrain  in  front  to  cover  these  trenches  against  any  surprise 
attack,  and  install  itself  securely  in  the  conquered  position  by 
constructing  a  double  line  of  trenches. 

TROOPS    PARTICIPATING    IN    THE    ATTACK FROM    NORTH    TO    SOUTH. 

1.  In  the  first  line. — A  platoon  of  the  Ninth  Company,  ordered 
to  cover  the  right  flank  of  the  attack;  the  Eleventh,  Twelfth, 
Seventh,  and  Sixth  Companies;  a  platoon  of  the  Eighth  Com- 
pany ordered  to  flank  the  attack  on  the  left ;  "  Stosstrupps  " 
(assault  units),  some  belonging  to  the  Third  Light  Infantry  Bat- 
talion ("Sturmbataillon"  of  the  Second  Germany  Army),  the* 
others  belonging  to  the  "  Sturmkompagnie  "  of  the  Two  Hundred 
and  Thirty-fourth  Infantry  Division;  pioneers  of  the  Three 
Hundred  and  Sixtieth  Company;  three  Stosstrupps  (assault 
units,  each  of  8  to  10  men)  and  two  groups  of  pioneers  were 
assigned  to  each  of  the  Twelfth  and  Seventh  Companies ;  five  to 
six  "Stosstrupps"  (assault  units)  and  two  groups  of  pioneers 
to  each  of  the  Eleventh  and  Sixth  Companies  placed  on  the 
wings. 

47 


48  GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 

The  liaison  between  the  Cepy  Farm  and  the  Eighth  Company 
was  assured  by  elements  of  the  regiment  at  the  right  of  the 
division  occupying  the  Saint  Quentin  sector  (Four  Hundred  and 
Forty-eighth  Infantry  Regiment,  Two  Hundred  and  Thirty-third 
Infantry  Division). 

2.  As  support. — Along  the  entrenched  line  of  Hy£nes,  Bois 
Squaw,  Terrier  de  Renard,  94.05:  Two  platoons  of  the  Ninth 
Company,  the  Tenth  and  Fifth  Companies,  and  two  platoons  of 
the  Eighth  Company. 

These  units  were  to  furnish  fatigue  detachments,  to  rein- 
force and  relieve  at  need  the  companies  which  suffered  heavy 
losses,  and  to  construct  a  line  of  trenches  on  the  eastern  slope 
of  the  ridge. 

3.  As  reserve. — The  First  Battalion,  with  two  companies  in 
the  former  first  position ;  the  second  company  in  the  Hauptmann 
trench;  the  first  company  in  the  southern  part  of  the  Hetre 
trench ;  two  companies  a  little  further  to  the  rear ;  the  fourth 
company  in  the  shelters  of  the  Huissier  trench,  and  the  third 
company  in  the  Hamac  trench. 

The  whole  regiment  had  thus  been  pushed  forward  to  take 
part  in  the  attack  or  to  support  it  if  there  were  need.  The 
attacking  troops  proper  included  150  men  for  the  "  Stosstrupps  " 
(assault  units),  70  men  for  the  pioneers,  and  450  men  at  least  of 
the  Four  Hundred  and  Fifty-first  Infantry  Regiment 

Preparations  for  the  attack. — During  the  fortnight  preceding 
the  attack  the  Germans  worked  steadily  in  the  construction  of 
battery  emplacements,  trench  mortar  emplacements,  shelters, 
buried  telephone  lines,  and  new  communication  trenches. 

In  addition  the  four  companies  intended  for  the  first  line  were 
sent  to  Remaucourt  between  the  1st  and  the  7th  of  August  to 
practice  the  projected  attack ;  and  each  one  of  these  companies 
took  part  in  at  least  one  attacking  practice  by  day  and  two  by 
night. 

Preliminary  movements. — On  the  6th  the  attacking  companies 
were  taken  to  the  Jungwaldstellung  (Huissier  and  Hamac 
trenches)  ;  on  the  evenings  of  the  7th  and  8th  they  occupied 
the  first  line  (Hetre  trench). 

During  the  night  from  the  9th  to  the  10th,  between  11  and  12 
o'clock1  p.  m.  the  supporting  companies  in  their  turn  occupied 
the  first  line.  The  attacking  companies,  the  "  Stosstrupps " 
(assault  units),  and  the  pioneers  attached  to  them  were  ;is 

•All  time  indicated  Is  French  time. 


GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS.  49 

sembled,  the  Eleventh  Company  on  the  western  edge  of  the 
Indian  Wood,  the  Twelfth  near  the  road  from  Crater  93.13  to 
Fayet,  the  Seventh  at  Terrier  de  Renard,  and  the  Sixth  on  road 
No.  44. 

Between  12  o'clock  midnight  and  1  a.  m.,  these  four  com- 
panies made  a  new  rush  forward  and  occupied  their  positions  for 
the  start,  almost  at  the  eastern  military  crest  of  the  ridge,  at  a 
distance  from  the  French  line  varying  from  75  to  200  meters 
(see  appended  sketch),  while  the  supporting  companies  took 
their  place. 

Arrangement. — The  Sixth,  Setenth,  and  Twelfth  Companies 
were  arranged  in  two  waves,  each  formed  of  a  line  of  skir- 
mishers 20  meters  apart.  The  eleventh  company  was  formed  in 
three  waves,  each  composed  of  small  detachments  of  eight  men 
and  one  noncommissioned  officer. 

The  first  wave  included  the  "  Stosstrupps "  of  the  Third 
Light  Infantry  Battalion  and  of  the  divisional  Sturmkompagnie, 
reenforced  by  groups  chosen  from  the  companies  (Ersatzstos- 
strupps). 

The  second  wave  of  each  company  (and  the  third  of  the 
Eleventh  Company)  had  two  or  three  light  machine  guns  and 
twc  "  Granatenwerfer  "  (bomb  throwers). 

The  ordinary  machine  guns,  grouped  behinc^  the  Gangue 
and  Hoquet  trenches  on  the  evening  of  the  ninth,  were  to  follow 
up  the  advance,  but  none  of  the  prisoners  saw  them  during 
action. 

Finally,  100  or  200  meters  to  the  rear  of  the  second  wave, 
fatigue  detachments  brought  up  materiel  and  munitions. 

Missions. — The  mission  of  the  first  waves  ("Stosstrupps" 
and  "  Ersatzstosstrupps  " )  was  to  seize  the  first  French  trench 
(Landerneau-Dancourt-Eylau)  and  to  push  on  as  quickly  as 
possible  to  the  determined  objective. 

The  second  waves  were  to  occupy  the  Dancourt  and  Lander- 
neau  trenches,  then  utilize  the  shell  holes  to  organize  an  ad- 
vanced line,  following  approximately  the  military  crest  and 
passing  about  30  meters  wrest  of  crater  87.10,  returning  along 
the  Gricourt  Road,  then  advancing  anew  toward  the  west  in  the 
region  of  the  Dancourt-Eylau  junction. 

The  "  Stosstrupps "  were  ordered  to  return  to  the  rear  as 
soon  as  their  mission  had  been  fulfilled  and  as  soon  as  the  fire 
of  the  French  artillery  should  permit. 


50  GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 

The  aim  of  the  support  companies,  in  addition  to  the  contin- 
gent reinforcement  of  the  attacking  waves  and  their  replenish- 
ing, was  likewise  to  advance  to  the  eastern  military  crest  of  the 
ridge  and  to  establish  a  trench  there  immediately,  connecting 
the  Indian  Wood  and  the  Squaw  Wood,  then  to  pass  west  of  the 
Terrier  de  Renard  to  the  extremity  of  the  communication 
trenches  dug  before  the  attack  connecting  with  garden  93.05. 

(Photographs  taken  the  13th  show  that  only  a  portion  of 
this  trench  had  been  constructed  at  that  date.) 

Execution. — At  1  a.  m.  the  German  artillery  and  the  "  Minen- 
werfer"  (noticeably  increase<j  for  the  operation)  opened  an 
extremely  heavy  fire  on  our  first  lines  and  to  the  rear  of  them. 

At  10  minutes  past  1  the  heavy  and  medium  trench  mortars 
ceased  fire  and  the  artillery  increased  its  fire. 

The  attacking  waves,  without  waiting  any  other  signal,  imme- 
diately rushed  toward  our  trenches.  In  spite  of  the  resistance 
of  our  troops  they  succeeded  in  seizing  the  Landerneau  and 
Dancourt  trenches  and  in  reaching  the  Saint-Quentin-Gricourt 
Road.  On  the  .wings  the  "  Stosstrupps  "  attempted  to  advance 
to  the  Chilly  and  Eylau  trenches,  but  they  were  soon  stopped, 
and  then  repulsed  in  the  vicinity  of  the  road. 

AUGUST  10  AND   11. 

(a)  South  sector  of  the  line  87.09-91.11. — As  soon  as  they 
reached  the  west  side  of  the  hollow  road  the  Sixth  and  Seventh 
Companies  were  subjected  to  a  violent  bombardment  from  the 
French  artillery  and  suffered  serious  losses.  They  were  each 
reenforced  by  a  platoon  of  the  Eighth  Company,  which  was  thus 
entirely  engaged.  In  the  afternoon  of  the  10th  they  tried  in 
vain  to  advance  to  the  Eylau  trench,  but  a  French  counter 
attack  pushed  them  back  into  the  Dancourt  trench,  which 
position  they  held  with  difficulty. 

At  nightfall  the  Sixth  and  Seventh  Companies  were  hastily 
relieved  by  the  Fifth  and  Third  Companies,  each  reinforced  by  a 
platoon  of  the  Second  Company.  These  latter  succeeded  in  stop- 
ping our  advance  in  the  Dancourt  trench  and  tried  to  organize 
their  position  but  were  prevented  everywhere  by  our  machine- 
gun  fire. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  llth  the  French  artillery  fire,  which 
was  very  accurate,  increased  in  intensity.  The  number  of 
killed  and  wounded  increased  rapidly  and  many  men  tried  to 
escape  into  the  Squaw  Wood,  the  Terrier  de  Renard,  and  the 


GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS.  51 

Garden  93.05  (die  Gartiierei),  but  the  mujority  of  them,  stopped 
by  the  former  French  wire  entanglements,  which  had  not  been 
completely  destroyed,  were  killed  by  our  projectiles. 

In  the  energetic  French  counter  attack  at  6  p.  m.  the  last 
occupants  of  the  Dancourt  trench,  about  30  men  per  company, 
were  either  captured  or  killed. 

(I))  North  sector  o/  the  line  87.09-91.11.— The  Eleventh  and 
Twelfth  Companies,  which  took  a  position  at  the  hollow  road 
on  the  two  sides  of  the  Crater  87.10,  immediately  after  the  1 
o'clock  attack,  occupied  at  daybreak  a  line  of  shell  holes  sit- 
uated about  30  meters  west  of  this  road.  There  they  were  sub- 
jected to  a  violent  French  bombardment,  which  was  responsible 
for  heavy  losses,  and  they  likewise  suffered  from  a  heavy  Ger- 
man artillery  barrage  fire.  In  the  afternoon  of  the  10th  they 
were  driven  from  the  hollow  road  by  one  of  our  counter  attacks 
and  left  several  prisoners  in  our  hands.  They  still  hold  the 
Lauderneau  trench. 

In  the  evening  they  had  to  be  relieved  or  reenforced  by  the 
Ninth  and  Tenth  Companies  which  were  in  a  position  behind 
them  as  support. 

On  the  morning  of  the  llth  the  French  troops  cleared  the 
Lunderneau  trench  by  grenade  combat  and  took  up  their  posi- 
tion there,  thus  retaking  all  the  terrain  lost  in  this  sector. 

ARRANGEMENTS    MADE    BY    THE    GERMAN    COMMANDER    FOR    THE    OR- 
GANIZATION   OF    THE    CONQUERED    TERRAIN. 

The  enemy  intended  to  organize  strongly  the  conquered  posi- 
tion and  to  occupy  it  against  all  counter  attacks  from  us. 

Careful  orders  had  been  given  to  this  end.  All  the  regimental 
companies,  including  the  machine-gun  companies,  three  com- 
panies of  pioneers,  and  of  the  "Armierungs  bataillone"  (bat- 
talions of  laborers)  were  to  participate  in  the  work,  each  at  a 
carefully  defined  point. 

ROLE  OF   THE  ENEMY   ARTILLERY  AND   TRENCH    MORTARS. 

Preparation. — It  seems  that  the  enemy  artillery  began,  on 
July  25,  to  adjust  their  fire  on  all  the  important  points  of  the 
sector,  communication  trenches  and  trenches;  but  this  adjust- 
ment was  made  with  such  care  not  to  alter  the  appearance  of 
the  regular  fire  that  it  was  scarcely  discernible. 

On  July  27  different  caliber  trench  mortars  in  turn  began 
their  adjustment  with  the  same  caution. 


5£  GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 

There  was  increased  activity  iu  the  adjustment  during  the 
first  days  Of  August;  but  at  this  time,  following  statements 
made  by  Polish  deserters  of  the  Twenty-third  Reserve  Infantry 
Regiment,  who  disclosed  the  intentions  of  the  enemy,  our  artil- 
lery became  more  active  and  began  its  demolition  fire  on  the 
trench-mortar  positions  which  were  known.  This  recrudescence 
of  activity  of  the  enemy  artillery  might  easily  have  been  taken 
as  a  simple  reprisal. 

On  the  6th  of  August  counter-battery  fire  began  against  our 
75-mm.  batteries  in  the  Bois  de  la  Loutre;  200  rounds  of  the 
ISO's  on  one,  30  rounds  of  the  105's  on  the  other. 

The  7th  was  a  quiet  day,  doubtless  because  of  the  thickness 
of  the  weather. 

On  August  8,  at  9  a.  m.,  the  enemy  began  a  violent  demolition 
fire  with  150's  and  large-caliber  trench  mortars  (350  rounds  in 
a  few  hours).  From  this  time  on  the  enemy  artillery  kept  up 
a  less  violent  but  steady  fire  on  our  whole  first  line  to  prevent 
the  trenches  and  auxiliary  defenses  from  being  repaired. 

At  8  in  the  evening,  moreover,  the  enemy  caused  us  to  open 
our  barrage  fire  by  firing  red  rockets.  This  was  doubtless  for 
the  purpose  of  finding  the  range  of  our  barrage  batteries.  On 
the  9th,  at  11  a.  m.,  he  resumed  his  counter-battery  fire,  always 
in  the  region  of  the  Bois  de  la  Loutre,  with  time-fuse  105's  and 
150's  (150  rounds  in  3  hours). 

EXECUTION   OF  THE  ATTACK. 

(a)  On  August  10,  at  1  a.  m.,  a  very  violent  fire  opened  sud- 
denly on  our  lines.  The  signal  for  it  was  given  by  two  white 
rockets,  one  coming  from  Cepy  Farm  and  the  other  from  the 
Indian  Wood,  marking  the  line  of  attack. 

This  fire  included: 

1.  A  heavy  bombardment  of  all  caliber  trench  mortars  on 
our  first  lines  and  their  auxiliary  defenses,  from  the  Eylau 
trench  to  the  Chilly  trench.     Flange  bombs  were  thrown  at 
the  same  time  on  the  same  points. 

2.  A  violent  barrage  fire  on  the  whole  Fayet  hollow. 

3.  A  bombardment  with  all  caliber  shells  on  the  village  <>f 
Fayet,  the  Breton  communication  trench,  and  the  Selency  road 

At  10  minutes  past  1  the  trench-mortar  fire  stopped  abruptly. 
This  was.  the  signal  agreed  upon  for  the  attacking  waves  to 
start.  The  barrage  fire  and  the  rear  bombardment  continued 
until  half-past  2,  slightly  diminishing,  in  intensity. 


GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS.  63 

During  the  entire  afternoon  of  the  10th  there  was  keen  activity 
of  the  enemy  artillery  in  the  sector. 

( b )  Counter  battery. — Neutralization  fire  on  our  batteries  like- 
wise commenced  at  1  o'clock.  It  was  aimed  principally  at  the 
battalion  which  ordinarily  dropped  barrage  on  the  attacked 
front.  The  fire  seemed  to  be  executed  by  two  batteries  of  150 
mm.  and  one  battery  of  77  mm.,  solely  with  tear-producing  and 
asphyxiating  shells,  and  was  conducted  in  twTo  periods  from  1 
to  1.30  and  from  2  to  3  at  a  slow  rate,  interspersed  by  rapid 
volleys. 

The  number  of  projectiles  thus  sent  was  calculated  at  1,500. 

DAYS   FOLLOWING   THE   ATTACK. 

The  activity  of  the  enemy  artillery  during  the  10th  and  llth 
consisted  for  the  most  part  of  barrage  fire  opened  at. different 
times  to  prevent  any  attempts  at  counter  attacks  and  to  keep 
our  troops  from  being  reassembled.  This  fire  was  directed 
almost  exclusively  on  the  hollow  of  Fayet  and  on  the  Chilly 
trench. 

Several  times,  and  particularly  on  the  llth,  at  5  p.  m.,  the 
enemy  conducted  a  violent  fire  on  our  first  line  with  heavy 
caliber. 

No  particular  activity  of  the  trench  mortars  was  noticed  after 
the  attack. 

IMPORTANCE  OF  ARTILLERY  IN  ACTION. 

Forty-seven  battery  emplacements  were  reported  in  action 
during  the  night  of  the  9th-10th,  10  of  which  had  not  before  this 
been  sighted. 

A  comparison  of  all  the  batteries  reported  in  action  opposite 
the  front  of  the  Army  Corps  in  the  period  from  the  13th  to  the 
23d  of  July  (German  attack  on  the  Pire-Aller)  with  those  in  the 
period  from  the  3d  to  the  13th  of  August  shows  that  the  number 
of  batteries  was  practically  the  same.  But  it  was  observed  that 
29  batteries  seen  in  action  from  the  13th  to  the  23d  of  July,  and 
almost  all  in  the  region  including  Isles-Harly-Mesnil-Saint-Lau- 
rent,  have  since  disappeared,  and  that  during  the  last  10  days  25 
emplacements,  either  new  or  long  since  silent,  displayed  activity, 
almost  all  in  the  region  Omissy-Morcourt-Saint-Quentin. 

Account  must  be  taken  of  the  fact  that  certain  emplacements 
are  doubtful  and  that  others  may  correspond  only  to  a  section, 


64  GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 

or  even  a  single  piece.  We  are  led  to  the  conclusion  that  when- 
ever the  enemy  makes  attacks  like  that  on  Pire-Aller  or  on  the 
Mennechet  signal  station  they  have  at  their  disposal  15  or  20 
batteries,  withdrawn  from  near-by  commands,  to  reinforce  the 
commands  supporting  the  attack. 

As  for  the  trench  mortars,  information  supplied  by  prisoners 
regarding  emplacements  which  they  saw  in  action  lead  us  to 
believe  that  the  enemy  used  for  the  attack : 

All  the  trench  mortars  (heavy,  medium,  and  light)  of  the 
trench-mortar  company  of  the  Two  Hundred  and  Thirty-fourth 
Infantry  Division ;  light  trench  mortars  of  the  Four  Hundred 
and  Fifty-first  Infantry  Regiment  (12  pieces)  ;  and  the  larger 
part  of  the  light  trench  mortars  of  the  two  regiments  on  the 
right  and  on  the  left  of  the  Four  Hundred  and  Fifty-first  Infantry 
Regiment,  or  a  total  of  four  240-mm.  trench  mortars,  six  170-mm. 
trench  mortars,  and  from  thirty  to  forty  75-min.  trench  mortars. 

ARRANGEMENTS  MADE  BY  THE  ENEMY  TO  ORGANIZE  THE  CONQUERED 
POSITIONS    (DANCOURT  TRENCH). 

By  their  attack  on  the  9th  and  10th  of  August  on  our  Lan- 
derneau  and  Dancourt  trenches  the  Germans  counted  on  taking 
from  us  the  whole  ridge  from  the  Mennechet  signal  station  to 
the  Cepy  Farm,  solidly  organizing  themselves  there,  occupying 
it  in  force,  and  repulsing  all  counter  attacks  on  our  part. 

This  fact  is  proved  by  a  document  found  on  the  corpse  of  the 
lieutenant  in  command  of  the  Third  Company,  Four  Hundred 
and  Fifty-first  Regiment. 

This  document  includes : 

(1)  A  battle  map,  with  the  plan  of  the  trenches  and  communi- 
cation trenches  to  be  constructed. 

(2)  A  detailed  list  of  the  work  to  be  undertaken  by  each 
company  as  soon  as  the  position  was  conquered. 

The  translation  of  this  document  is  given  below,  with  the 
reproduction  of  the  map.  (The  names  of  the  French  trenches 
and  the  French  system  of  cross  sectioning  have  been  added  to 
the  latter  to  facilitate  its  reading.) 

Before  the  attack  the  Four  Hundred  and  Fifty-first  Infantry 
Regiment  occupied  a  first  position  (position  A),  including  two 
lines  of  trenches — the  Hauptmann  and  Hetre  trenches,  the 
Gangue  and  Hoquet  trenches;  a  second  position  (Bereitschaft 
support  position),  likewise  including  two  lines — the  Condole 
and  Huissier  trenches,  the  Humour  trench  (unfinished)  ;  and, 


GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS.  66 

finally,  toward  the  rear,  tin  interimi'luti*  position — the  Gland 
and  Hamac  trenches. 

As  soon  as  the  Mennechet  Ridge  signal  station  was  taken  a 
new  position,  including  two  lines  of  trenches,  was  to  be  con- 
structed— an  "  advanced  line  "  following  the  western  military 
crest  of  the  ridge,  utilizing  in  part  our  Dancourt  trench,  with  a 
"  counterslope  line  "  following  the  eastern  military  crest. 

These  two  lines  were  to  be  protected  by  extensive  wire  en- 
tanglements. 

Four  communication  trenches  were  to  be  constructed,  start- 
ing from  the  initial  sections  made  before  the  attack,  to  connect 
this  new  position  with  the  old  ones. 

In  order  to  execute  this  work  and  at  the  same  time  occupy 
the  sector  with  sufficient  strength  to  resist  all  our  counter  attacks, 
the  new  position  was  to  be  held  by  four  companies  in  the  ad- 
vanced line  and  four  companies  in  the  counterslope  line. 

The  reserve  battalion  was  to  have  two  companies  in  the  old 
first  position  and  two  companies  in  the  old  support  position,  and 
the  works  were  to  be  carried  on  by  trench-mortar  companies 
and  machine-gun  companies  in  the  preparation  of  their  own 
positions,  three  companies  of  pioneers,  specially  charged  with  the 
construction  of  shelters  and  of  command  posts,  and  four  com- 
panies of  workmen  (of  Armierungs  battalions)  to  make  im- 
provements in  the  former  position  and  in  its  rear. 

Everything  had  been  carefully  provided  with  reference  to 
success. 


ORDER  OF  THE  COLONEL  IN  COMMAND  OF  THE 
FOUR  HUNDRED  AND  FIFTY-FIRST  INFANTRY 
REGIMENT. 

[Translation  of  a  German  document.] 


PROGRAM  OF  WORKS  TO  BE  CONSTRUCTED  AFTER  AUGUST  9,  1917. 

During  periods  when  no  important  combats  are  taking  place, 
the  organization  of  the  conquered  height  should  be  pushed  with 
the  utmost  energy.  The  technical  execution  of  this  task  should 
be  guided  by  the  following  general  principles : 

(a)  Protective  defenses  of  the  first-line  trench  and  the  coun- 
terslope  position. — Fifty  meters  in  front  of  our  own  trench,  a 
first  line  of  spiral  wire ;  to  the  rear,  on  our  side,  hedgehogs  about 
1  meter  wide  and  closely  intertwined ;  immediately  behind  these, 
a  second  line  of  spiral  wire,  then  a  wire  entanglement  with  a 
depth  of  5  meters  erected  on  screw  stakes.  The  hedgehogs 
should  be  so  placed  that  at  the  least  displacement  they  become 
closely  bound  by  their  hooks  to  near-by  wires.  The  second 
wire  entanglement,  with  a  depth  of  8  meters,  erected  on  screw 
stakes,  should  be  located  10  meters  further  back. 

(6)  Shelters. — Do  not  repair  the  old  French  shelters  in  the 
first  line  unless  their  entrances  face  toward  our  side  and  unless 
they  fulfill  all  conditions  demanded  by  first-line  shelters. 
Otherwise,  construct  new  shelters.  Shelters  on  the  counter- 
slope  position  should  have  a  cover  8.50  meters  thick;  arid  this 
can  be  all  the  more  easily  provided  as  the  terrain  in  this  place 
rises  from  the  entrance  toward  the  shelter  proper. 

(c)  Trenches. — Do  not  use  the  old  trenches  in  the  first  line 
unless  their  construction  is  adaptable ;  if  not,  it  is  preferable  to 
dig  new  trenches.  In  the  counterslope  position,  first  dig  the 
small  sections  traced  in  color  to  a  depth  of  1.50  meters,  then 
the  junctions,  a.nd  finally  deepen  all  the  trenches  to  2.20  meters. 
56 


GERMAN  NOTES   ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 


57 


Num- 
ber 
of  the 
order. 


Vnits. 


Works  to  be  constructed. 


Numbers. 


Length  of 
the  work. 


Company  A . . 


Company  B. 


do..:.... 

do 

Company  C . . 


do 


do 


10 


12 


Company  D. 

do 

..do... 


Construction  of  a  trench 
from  the  Mennechet  Mill 
to  100  meters  north  of  the 
Petit  Crater-Fayet  Road. 
Excavation  of  recesses  and 
construction  of  shelters  for 
noncommissioned  officers' 
stations. 

Auxiliary  defenses  in  front  of 
this  trench. 

Lookout  service 

Construction  of  a  trench  run- 
ning from  100  meters  north 
of  the  hollow  road  from 
Petit  Crater  to  Fayet,  to 
the  southern  extremity* of 
the  hollow  road  200  meters 
south  of  Petit  Crater  (limit 
of  the  battalion).  Excava- 
tion of  recesses  and  con- 
struction of  shelters  for 
noncommissioned  officers' 
stations. 

Auxiliary  defenses  in  front 
of  this  trench. 

Lookouts 

Construction  of  a  new  trench, 
including  auxiliary  defen- 
ses, going  from  the  Menne- 
chet Mill  to  the  Indian 
Wood. 

Construction  of  a  communi- 
cation trench  connecting 
the  Squaw  Wood  to  Com- 
pany A's  new  trench. 

Construction  with  auxiliary 
defenses  of  the  Bois  Squaw 
trench  and  the  Harem 
communication  trench, 
from  the  Squaw  Wood  to 
the  second  line  of  position 
A  (Hoquet  trench);  repair- 
ing of  the  first  line  of  posi- 
tion A  (with  auxiliary  de- 
fenses) from  the  boundary 
of  the  sector  of  the  regi- 
ment at  the  right  (91.17)  as 
far  as  92.14.  Construction 
of  shelters  (see  No.  40). 

Construction  of  a  new  trench, 
including  auxiliary  de- 
fenses, from  the  Mennechet 
Mill  to  the  Indian  Wood. 

Construction  of  a  communi- 
cation trench  connecting 
the  Terrier  de  Renard 
grove  with  the  Petit  Crater. 

Construction  of  the  counter- 
slope  position,  including 
auxiliary  defenses  from  the 
Squaw  Wood  (former 
Fayet  position)  to  150 
meters  southeast  of  the 
Grand  Cratere  Petit  Cra- 
tere  Road.  Construction 
of  shelters  (see  No.  38). 


£  company... 


.do. 


....do 

...do... 


.do. 


.do. 
.do. 


..do. 


.do. 


do.. 


.do. 


do 


Will  depend 
on  the  situ- 
ation. 


58 


GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 


Num- 
ber 
of  the 
order. 


Units. 


Works  to  be  constructed. 


Numbers. 


Length  of 
the  work. 


13 


Company  E.. 


do 

do 

Company  F... 


20 


21 


.do. 


do 

Company  G.. 


.do. 


.do. 


Company  H.. 


Construct,  partly  new  and 
partly  by  transforming  the 
old  French  trench,  accord- 
ing to  conditions,  a  trench 
going  from  the  southern 
extremity  of  the  hollow 
road,  100  meters  south  of 
Petit  Cratere  (battalion 
limit)  to  a  point  situated 
360  meters  beyond,  in  a 
southeasterly  direction 
(limit  of  the  sector  of  the 
company  at  the  left). 

Auxiliary  defenses  in  front 
of  this  trench. 

Lookouts  *  ................... 

Construction  of  a  trench 
going  from  the  left  wing  of 
E  Company  (see  No.  13)  to 
150  meters  northwest  of  the 
crossroads  situated  on  the 
northwest  peak  of  the 
Cepy  Farm.  Partly  all 
new,  partly  restoration, 
according  to  conditions,  of 
the  old  French  trench. 
Construction  of  shelters  for 
noncommissioned  officers' 
stations  and  excavation  of 
recesses. 

Auxiliary  defenses  in  front 
of  this  trench. 

Lookouts  .................... 

Construction  of  a  new  trench 
with  auxiliary  defenses, 
connecting  the  left  wing  of 
F  Company  to  the  trench 
of  the  adjoining  regiment 
near  the  west  of  the  Cepy 
Farm. 

Construction  of  the  com- 
munication trench  Hin- 
denburg,  from  the  Terrier 
de  Eenard  to  the  first 
trench  of  E  Company. 

Construction  of  the  counter- 
slope  position  with  auxili- 
ary defenses,  in  liaison 
with  D  Company  (see  No. 
12)  as  far  as  150  meters 
northwest  of  the  northwest 
peak  of  garden  95.15.  Con- 
struction of  shelters  (see 
No.  38). 

Construction  of  a  new  trench 
with  auxiliary  defenses 
connecting  the  left  wing  of 
F  Company  with  the 
trench  of  the  neighboring 


J  company.. 


regiment   west   of 
Farm. 


Cepy 


.do. 


....do... 
....do... 


.do.. 


.do. 
.do. 


..do 


.do. 


..do.. 


GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 


59 


Num- 
ber 
of  the 
order. 

Units. 

Works  to  be  constructed. 

Numbers. 

Length  of 
the  work. 

23 

Company  H  .  . 

Construction  of  a  communi- 
cation trench  leading  from 

$  company... 

the  garden  95.15  to  Com- 

24 

....do  

pany  F's  first  trench. 
Construction  of  the  counter- 

....do  

slope  position,  with  obsta- 

cles,  in   liaison  with    G 

Company  as  far  as  the  hol- 
low road  leading  to  the 

Cepy  Farm,  and  the  con- 

struction of  shelters  (see 

No.  38). 

25 

Company  I  

Repairing  of  the  first  line  of 
position  A  with  auxiliary 

§  company  .  .  . 

defenses        (Hauptmanh 

trench)  from  90.14  to  100 

meters  north  of  the  small 

butt;  maintenance  of  the 

" 

Hindenburg  communi- 

cation trench  (95.11-98.13- 

05.16)  from   the   Haupt- 

mann  trench  to  the  Ho- 

quet    and     Preussenweg 

trench  (from  Grand  Cra- 

tere  to  Hill  122). 

26 

do  

Construction  of   the    Hin- 
denburg   communication 

J  company  .  .  . 

trench,  from  the  Haupt- 

mann     trench     to     the 

counterslope   position    of 

27 

Company  K.. 

G  Company  (92.09). 
Repair  of  the  He'tre  trench 
with    obstacles,    from    a 

§  company  .  .  . 

point  situated  100  meters 

north  of  the  butt  to  the 

boundary  of  the  regiment 

at  the  left.    Maintenance 

of  the   Ludendorff  com- 

munication trench  (98.06 

to  100.07). 

28 

do  

Construction  of  the  Luden- 

J company.. 

dorff   communication 

trench,  from  98.06  to  the 

termination  of  the  com- 

munication trench  of  gar- 

den 95.05  in  the  counter- 

slope  position. 

29 

Company  L  .  . 

Construction  of  shelters  in 

16  men  

2  shifts. 

the   Hoquet  trench   (see 

No.  42). 

30 

do  

Construction  of  a  shelter  for 

8  men  

Do. 

the  battalion    command 

post  (hill  122.8). 

31 

do  

Concrete  foundation  for  the 

30  men 

Do. 

signal  station  and  the  ob- 

servation station  of  the 

command  post  of  the  regi- 

ment (20.18). 

32 

.do  

Repair  of  the  company  posi- 

The rest. 

tion  and    the     Hinden- 

burg     communication 

trench  from  hill  118  to  98.13 

GERMAN  NOTES   ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 


Num- 
ber 
of  the 
order. 

Units. 

Works  to  be  constructed. 

Numbers. 

Length  of 
the  work. 

33 
34 

Company  M... 
.  do  

Safety  troops  and  party  for 
transfer  to  Morcourt. 
Unloading  and  transporta- 

i company. 
do  

35 

do 

tion  parties. 
Maintenance  of  the  company 

do 

36 

Four  hundred 

position  and   the  Luden- 
dorff           communication 
trench    from    the    Hache 
trench    to    the     Hoquet 
trench. 
Transportation  and  placing 

40  men  

According    to 

37 

and      fifty- 
first     Com- 
pany of  Pio- 
neers. 

do 

of  materiel  for  reenforcing 
the  auxiliary  defenses  in 
front  of  the  advanced  first 
trenches  on  hills  124.2  and 
126.4. 
Construction    of   the    com- 

40 men 

the      situa- 
tion. 

The    rest    in 

38 
39 

One  hundred 
and  fifty- 
ninth  Com- 
pany of  Pio- 
neers. 
..do  

mand  post  of  the  regiment. 
Construction  of  shelters  in 
the  counter-slope  position 
of  hills  124.2  and  126.4  (re- 
enforcing   D,   G,   and   H 
Companies). 
Clearing  out  of  the  blown-up 

28  men  
4  men.. 

two  shifts. 
2  shifts. 

Do. 

40 

41 
42' 
43 

Three  hundred 
and  sixtieth 
Company  of 
Pioneers. 
do  

do  
do. 

shelter  near  Grand  Cratere. 
Construction  of  shelters  in 
the  Squaw  Wood  position, 
on  hill  126.4  (reenforcing  E 
Company). 
Construction  of  the  battalion 
post  of  command,  hill  122.8. 
Construction  of  shelters  in 
the  Hoquet  trench. 
Concrete  foundation  for  the 

16  men  

do  
do  
20  men 

Do. 

Do. 
1  shift. 
Do 

44 
45 

46 

Machine-gun 
company. 

Light   trench 
mortars. 

Fifth  Com- 

observation station  of  the 
regimental  command  post 
and  the  signal  station  at 
Croix  d'Omissy  (19.17). 
Care   of   machine-gun  em- 
placements in  the  Haupt- 
mann  and  He'tre  trenches 
and  construction  of  ma- 
chine-gun nests  continued. 
Care  of  new  trench-mortar 
emplacements  ;  shelter  con- 
struction  continued    and 
supply  of  necessary  muni- 
tions. 
Drilling  for  a  well  north  of 

78  men  
60  men. 
8  men.. 

According   to 
the     situa- 
tion. 

1      shift      (8 

47 

pany  of  the 
Thirty-first 
Fatigue 
Battalion. 
do  

hill  118. 

Completion  of  the  Hinden- 
burg  trench  from  the  Croix 
d'Omissy  to  the  height 
where  the  post  of  com- 
mand of  C3  North  Battal- 
ion is  located  (probably 
crossroads,  hill  118). 

132  men. 

hours). 

GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 


61 


Num- 
ber 
of  the 
order. 

Units. 

Works  to  be  constructed. 

Numbers. 

Length  of 
the  work. 

48 

Fifth  Company 
of  the  Thirty- 

Construction  of  shelters  com- 
menced in  the  intermedi- 

\ company. 

first  Fatigue 

ate  north  position  (Gland 

Battalion. 

trench). 

49 

do  

Organization  of  the  interme- 

  do  

diate  north  position. 

50 

Fourth   Com- 

Completion of  the  Hinden- 

100  men. 

pany   Fifth 

burg  communication 

Bavarian 

trench    from    the    Croix 

Fatigue 

d'Omissy  to  the  post  of 

Battalion. 

command  of  the  C3  North 

Battalion  and  following. 

51 

.do  

Completion  of  shelters  com- 

^ company  . 

2  shifts. 

menced  in  the  south  inter- 

52 

do  

mediate  position. 
South    Gland    trench    and 

.do 

Hamac  trench  and  organi- 

zation of  the  south  inter- 

mediate position. 

53 

Fatigue    Bat- 

Construction of  a  communi- 

1 company. 

talion. 

cation    trench    from    the 

post  of  command  of  the  C3 

South  Battalion  07.11  to 

the  Hamac  trench. 

54 

do  

Completion  of  the  Hamac 

^  company. 

position. 

55 

.do  

Completion  of  auxiliary  de- 

do 

fenses  provided  for  in  No. 

54. 

AUGUST  9,  1917. 

( Signed )  VON  PONCET, 

Major,  in  Command  of  the  Regiment. 
For  duplicate  copy : 
WESTHAUSEN, 

Lieut.,  Commanding  Regimental  Working  Force. 


TACTICS  OF  GERMAN  ASSAULT  DETACHMENTS. 


Three  successful  coups,  which  are  recounted  below,  were 
recently  executed  by  German  assault  detachments  on  the 
heights  of  the  Meuse  and  to  the  north  of  Rheims. 

The  methods  used  in  the  three  cases  varied  according  to  the 
distance  of  the  objective  and  the  nature  of  the  terrain. 

In  the  first  two  cases  it  was  a  question  of  taking  a  distinct 
objective.  The  method  used  presents  the  following  character- 
istics : 

1.  Minute  preparation  of  the  operations  in  the  rear. — Getting 
together  the  units  for  the  attack  raised  from  the  Sturm  bat- 
talions, Sturm  companies,  and  Stosstrupps  for  preparatory  ex- 
ercises lasting  about  one  week  on  practice  trenches  represent- 
ing the  objectives  to  be  taken. 

2.  Preliminary  reconnaissance. — Executed  by    the   heads   of 
assault  detachments  one  or  two  days  in  advance. 

3.  Preparatory   ivork. — Openings    in    the    German    entangle- 
ments one  or  two  days  ahead  of  time,  and  in  the  French  en- 
tanglements a  few  hours  before  the  attack,  the  breeches  being 
made  with  wire  cutters. 

4.  Preparation  by  the  artillery  and  by  the  trench  mortars. — 
Very  violent  during  the  preparatory  work.    No  immediate  prep- 
aration.   Caging  fire  from  the  beginning  of  the  attack. 

5.  Attack  of  the  Stosstrupps  (distance  1,100  w.).— By  groups, 
using  the  shell  holes.    Reenforced  groups  on  the  wings  to  insure 
the  protection  of  the  flanks. 

In  the  third  case  it  covered  a  very  close  objective,  over  ditli- 
cult  ground.  The  Germans  wanted  to  take  it  by  surprise,  by 
means  of  a  mine  explosion.  No  preparations  in  the  rear.  No 
previous  reconnaissance.  Breeches  made  one  day  in  advance 
by  minenwerfers  and  artillery  firing  of  all  calibers,  to  isolate 
the  breeches.  The  troops,  not  knowing  the  terrain,  failed  to 
find  the  breeches. 

In  the  three  cases  the  attacks  failed,  thanks  to  the  vigilance 
of  our  watchmen  and,  especially  in  the  third  case,  thanks  to  the 
ability  of  one  regimental  information  officer. 
62 


GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS.  63 

1.  Operation  at  Villers-sous-Bonchamps  (distance  between  the 
lines  1,100  meters). — The  village  of  Villers  and  the  trenches 
to  the  east  have  the  appearance,  according  to  aerial  photog- 
raphy, of  an  isolated  center  jf  resistance  bound  to  the  rear  by 
one  single  very  long  communicating  trench. 

The  Germans  might  have  hoped,  had  they  realized  their  sur- 
prise attack,  to  capture  quite  a  large  garrison  and  retire  before 
the  supporting  troops  could  counter  attack,  because  of  their  too 
great  distance  and  because  of  the  barrage  fire. 

Consequently  the  operation  was  confided  to  one  very  well 
trained  Stosstrupp.  Minute  reconnaissance  was  made  of  the 
terrain,  breeches  were  prepared  in  the  entanglements,  and  a 
well-planned  itinerary  made.  In  a  word,  the  operation  was 
studied  to  the  smallest  detail. 

On  our  side  the  flat  and  bare  terrain,  the  great  distance  be- 
tween the  lines,  and  the  difficulty  of  counter  attacking  had  led 
us  to  cover  ourselves  by  a  mobile  watching  unit,  which,  seeing 
the  arrival  of  the  Stosstrupp,  delayed  it,  gave  the  alarm,  asked 
for  a  barrage,  and,  in  a  word,  suppressed  the  surprise. 

2.  Operation  to  the  south  of  the  Sechamp  Woods   (distance 
between  the  lines,  about  250'  meters) — Composition  of  assault 
detachment. — Twenty   men   taken  from   Sturm   Battalion   I ;    8 
men   taken  from   Sturm   company   of  the   Two   Hundred   and 
Twenty-seventh  Division ;  60  men  taken  from  the  infantry  regi- 
ment  of  the  Two   Hundred   and   Twenty-seventh   Division;   6 
officers,  3  sergeants,  9  gefeite  (106  men  all  told). 

Preparatory  exercises. — From  the  17th  to  the  24th  of  July 
the  detachment  was  exercised  at  a  special  training  ground  to 
the  northwest  of  Avaux.  The  French  trenches  to  be  taken  were 
represented  in  accordance  writh  the  most  recent  aerial  photo- 
graphs. A  very  detailed  preparation  of  the  surprise  attack  was 
made.  In  these  preparatory  exercises  the  artillery  officers  who 
were  to  support  the  attack  took  part. 

The  front  attack  was  about  300  meters  wide. 

The  detachment  had  two  light  machine  guns  and  one  auto- 
matic rifle  (musket).  Each  man  had  a  Mauser  pistol,  a  trench 
knife,  a  bayonet,  and  in  a  sandbag  16  grenades  with  handles  and 
8  egg-shaped  grenades. 

Several  heavy  and  field  artillery  batteries  and  about  50  trench 
mortars  (small  and  medium-size  minnenwerfers  and  Granaten- 
werfer)  supported  the  attack. 

Execution  of  the  attack. — Two  days  before,  viz,  on  the  24th 
of  July,  two  men  of  each  group  and  one  lieutenant  went  up  to 


64  GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 

the  front-line  trench  to  look  over  the  position,  and.  that  night 
they  made  breaches  in  the  German  entanglements. 

On  the  25th  of  July;  at  20  (8  p.  m.)  o'clock,  the  remainder  of 
the  detachment  embarked  in  three  autos  for  Pignicourt,  by  way 
of  Neufchatel.  From  there  they  went  on  foot  on  the  Moulin 
du  Merlet,  where  it  crosses  the  Suippe,  reached  the  Fink  Woods 
and  the  Sechamp  Woods. 

On  July  26th,  at  3  o'clock  (a.  m.)  (German  time),  the  de- 
tachment left  the  Sechamp  Woods.  Each  group  sent  two  men 
ahead,  who  advanced  by  creeping  or  by  bounds,  to  make  eight 
breaches  of  from  one  to  one  and  a  half  meters  in  the  French 
entanglements.  The  work  was  done  in  10  minutes  with  wire 
clippers.  The  men  returned,  and  the  entire  detachment  came 
out  of  the  V.  Haeseler  trench  at  3.50  a.  m.,  through  the  breach 
made  in  the  German  entanglements,  and  laid  down  in  shell 
holes  between  the  German  and  French  entanglements. 

During  this  time  the  light  and  medium  size  Minnenwerfer  and 
the  Granatenwerfer,  placed  back  of  the  German  front-line 
trenches,  opened  fire  and  battered  the  points  from  which  a 
counter  attack  might  come.  Then  the  Minnenwerfers  lengthened 
their  fire  on  the  French  lines  of  resistance. 

At  the  same  time  the  infantry  attack  was  started,  but  it  was 
stopped,  thanks  to  our  illuminating  rockets,  and  was  attended  to 
by  one  of  our  machine  guns.  The  men  fell  to  the  ground  or 
hid  in  the  grass. 

The  attack  did  not  pass  our  line  of  watching  posts.  In  case 
the  detachment  had  succeeded  in  further  penetrating  our  lines 
the  signal  for  lengthening  fire  was  to  have  been  given  by  means 
of  small  white  signal  flags,  which  were  to  be  waved  by  signal 
men  echeloned  along  the  way  they  had  come. 

3.  Operations  of  the  Eparges  Woods. — This  operation,  which 
was  executed  July  17,  began  the  14th,  with  enemy  artillery  ad- 
justment on  all  the  important  points  in  the  region  between  the 
Calonne  trench  and  the  Montgirmont  crest,  and  heavy  fire  on 
our  batteries. 

On  the  16th  fire  became  greater  and  was  accompanied  by  a 
destruction  fire  on  the  Gross  trench  with  large  Minnenwerfers. 
A  breach  was  opened  in  our  entanglements.  The  day  of  the 
17th  was  calm,  but  at  8.30  p.  m.  a  mine  was  fired  at  les  Eparges 
and  an  extremely  violent  fire  of  all  calibers  began  to  isolate  the 
points  where  the  destruction  had  been  made. 

Here,  too,  the  operation  was  confined  to  a  "  Stosstrupp,"  but 
these  men  were  only  brought  up  in  an  auto  the  evening  of  the 


GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS.  65 

17th,  without  having  made  any  previous  reconnaissance.  They 
had  shown  each  man  on  an  old  aerial  map  what  he  must  do. 
On  our  side  the  regimental  information  officer  of  the  sector  in- 
terpreted correctly  the  declarations  of  two  deserters  a  few  days 
before  in  that  region.  He  studied  with  care  the  fire  of  the 
enemy's  artillery  and  Minnenwerfer  and  the  information  from 
the  special  posts.  He  kept  everybody  awake  and  watching, 
and  having  guessed  the  point  aimed  at  by  the  enemy,  the  dis- 
position for  the  defense  and  the  counter  attack  were  made  auto- 
matically. 

The  enemy  gained  nothing  but  losses. 


NEW  DEFENSIVE  TACTICS. 


TRANSLATION    OF    A    GERMAN    DOCUMENT. 

[With  reference  to  Ypres  Group  la  87084/88187.] 

1.  The  following  terms  are  laid  down  and  will  be  strictly  ad- 
hered to  in  connection  with  the  new  defensive  tactics : 

(a)  Outpost  line  of  the  forward  zone   (Sicherungslinie  der 
Vorfeldzone)  to  indicate  our  own  front  line  in  the  forward  zone. 

(b)  Line  of  resistance  of  the  forward  zone  (Widerstandslinie 
der  Vorfeldzone)  to  indicate  that  line  to  which  the  infantry  in 
the  forward  zone  will  retire  in  the  first  instance,  in  the  garrison 
of  which  it  will  be  incorporated,  and  in  which  it  will  offer 
resistance. 

(c)  Mam  line  of  resistance  (Hauptwiderstandslinie)  to  indi- 
cate the  line  where  the  decisive  encounter  will  take  place. 

In  order  to  avoid  misunderstandings  and  confusion,  no  other 
terms  will  be  used. 

2.  The  forward  zone  in  front  of  the  main  line  of  resistance 
will  be  held  as  lightly  as  possible.    The  strength  of  the  garrison 
will  depend  on  the  ground  and  the  locality.     Generally  speak- 
ing, the  main  bodies  of  the  companies  of  the  battalion  in  front 
line  will  be  posted  in  the  main  line  of  resistance,  and  only  small 
detachments  (a  group  per  company  with  1  machine  gun,  or  2 
or  3  platoons  taken  from  1  company)   will  be  moved  into  the 
forward  zone  for  the  purpose  of  repelling  large  hostile  patrols. 
With  this  object,  it  is  advisable  to  hold  the  weakly  garrisoned 
forward  zone  as  a  zone  of  defense,  organized  in  depth,  with  the 
troops  distributed  checkerwise,  and  not  to  hold  only  the  front 
line  by  a  series  of  posts  forming  a  single  line  which  can  be 
quickly  penetrated. 

The  action  of  this  garrison  of  the  forward  zone  will  vary. 
Generally  speaking,  it  will  resist  and  delay  the  enemy ;  that  is, 
it  will  only  retire  when  forced  to  by  the  enemy  or  on  receipt  of 
a  definite  order  as  to  the  origin  of  which  the  commander  is 
satisfied.  The  establishment  of  hostile  posts  in  our  forward 
zone  must  be  absolutely  prevented. 


GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS.  67 

3.  On  receipt  of  the  code  word  "  Grosskampf  am  10.x  6  vorm  " 
("  Large  attack  on  10/10  at  6.00  a.  m."),  which  will  be  sent  out 
by  group  headquarters  as  early  as  possible  on  the  previous  even- 
ing, if  an  attack  on  a  large  scale  is  anticipated,  the  front  line 
of  the  forward  zone  will  be  withdrawn  according  to  plan  about 
500  meters   (beginning  at  the  above-mentioned  hour)   into  the 
"  line  of  resistance  of  the  forward  zone,"  in  which  a  few  light 
machine  guns  and  Granatenwerfer  will  have  been  previously  dug 
in.     This  "  line  of  resistance  of  the  forward  zone "  must  be 
permanently  marked  out  on  the  ground  by  means  of  pegs,  trip 
wire,  posts,  sticks  painted  with  luminous  paint,  flags,  etc. 

At  those  points  \vhere  the  present  front  line  of  the  forward 
zone  is  less  than  500  meters  from  the  main  line  of  resistance,  it 
is  best  for  the  outposts  to  fall  back  on  the  main  line  of  re- 
sistance. When  there  is  no  forward  zone,  the  disposition  of  the 
garrison  will  remain  unaltered. 

4.  The  distance  of  500  meters  appears  to  correspond  with  the 
British  orders  for  the  position  of  their  barrage.     The  British 
first  put  a  protective  barrage  on  to  the  area  to  be  attacked,  con- 
sisting of  a  wave  of  fire  540  meters  in  depth,  measured  from  the 
front  line  of  our  forward  zone.    This  barrage  then  advances. 
It  is  heaviest  in  the  vicinity  of  the  front  line  of  our  forward 
zone,  wrhere  it  consists  of  artillery,  machine-gun,  and  rifle  fire. 
At  a  distance  of  500-600  meters  from  the  front  line  of  our  for- 
M-ard  zone  it  is  considerably  less  intense. 

5.  As  a  natural  consequence,  our  artillery  defense  will  be  or- 
ganized as  follows : 

Shortly  after  the  zero  fixed  for  the  attack  on  a  large  scale,  our 
barrage  fire  and  annihilating  fire,  which  have  hitherto  covered 
predetermined  areas  in  front  of  our  foremost  outpost  line,  must 
now  be  put  down  farther  back  on  this  outpost  line.  The  time 
allowed  for  the  completion  of  the  infantry  movement  will  be 
fixed  at  15  minutes. 

The  moment  the  British  barrage  commences  our  counter  bar- 
rage must  be  put  down  at  once  with  every  battery  of  every  cali- 
ber, with  the  exception  of  the  heavy  flat-trajectory  guns,  in 
order  to  catch  the  British  before  they  can  follow  up  their  own 
barrage.  The  batteries  of  the  flanking  groups,  if  they  can  not 
switch  their  fire  with  direct  observations,  will  continue  to  fire 
on  their  allotted  areas  until  they  receive  orders  to  change  the 
direction  of  their  fire. 


68  GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 

Our  batteries  will  not  register  our  original  front  line,  but 
will  each  work  out  the  correction  required  for  shortening  range 
15  minutes  after  zero. 

6.  Should  the  expected  attack  in  force  not  take  place,  the 
order,  "  Old  line  X/10,  7.30  p.  m.,"  will  be  given  as  early  as  pos- 
sible on  X  day ;  in  which  case,  without  further  orders,  the  ad- 
vanced posts  will,  commencing  at  7.30  p.  m.,  push  forward  again 
into  the  front  line  of  our  forward  zone.    This  operation  will  be 
commenced  from  the  line  of  resistance  of  the  forward  zone  at 
7.30  p.  m.    After  7.30  p.  m.,  the  barrage  areas  will  be  those  pre- 
viously registered  in  advance  of  the  old  front  line  of  our  for- 
ward zone. 

7.  Contact  must  be  maintained  without  fail  with  units  on  the 
flanks,  especially  at  divisional  boundaries.     Every  commander 
is  responsible  for  maintaining  constant  touch  with  the  units  on 
his  flank. 

8.  Every    opportunity    for    counter    attack    must    be   seized, 
whether  it  be  made  in  front  of  the  main  line  of  resistance  or  in 
front  of  the  line  of  resistance  of  the  forward  zone,  as,  for  ex- 
ample, pursuit  of  the  enemy  who  has  been  repulsed  or  compelled 
to  retire.    Experience  has  shown  that  these  counter  attacks  yield 
booty  and  secure  our  hold  on  our  forward  zone. 

9.  (a)   Should  the  enemy  attack  before  the  code  word  "  Gross- 
kampf  "  has  been  given,  our  counter  barrage  will  be  put.  down  in 
front  of  the  foremost  outpost  line  of  the  forward  zone.     The 
outposts  on  the  line  of  the  attack,  as  soon  as  it  is  certain  that 
an  attack  is  taking  place,  will  retire  in  order  to  the  "  line  of 
resistance  of  the  forward  zone,"  and  will  be  absorbed  into  its 
garrison.     There  they  will  make  a  stand,  retiring  on  to  the 
main  line  of  resistance,  either  under  pressure  from  the  enemy 
or  on  receipt  of  an  order. 

Once  it  has  been  definitely  ascertained  that  this  movement 
has  been  completed,  the  company  commander  in  the  main  line 
of  resistance  will  send  up  a  white  flare,  breaking  into  small 
stars.  This  signal  will  be  repeated  to  the  rear.  The  artillery 
will  then  immediately  shorten  range  so  as  to  place  its  barrage 
close  in  front  of  the  main  line  of  resistance. 

(6)  The  same  tactics  will  be  resorted  to  when  "  Grosskampf  " 
has  been  signaled,  but  the  enemy  attacks  before  the  zero  given, 
i.  e.,  before  the  infantry  has  commenced  to  retire  to  the  line  of 
resistance  of  the  forward  zone.  They  will  equally  apply  in  the 
event  of  an  attack  subsequent  to  the  reoccupation  of  an  outpost 


GERMAN  NOTES   ON  MINOR  TACTICS.    •  69 

line  in  the  evening  which  had  been  evacuated  in  the  morning 
as  the  result  of  a  "  Grosskampf  "  signal. 

(c)  Should  the  enemy  attack  while  the  movements  resulting 
from  a  "Grosskampf"  signal  are  in  progress  (for  example, 
between  6.00  and  6.15  a.  m.,  when  "  Grosskampf  "  has  been  given 
for  6.00  a.  m.),  the  artillery  will  at  first  put  down  a  counter 
barrage  in  front  of  the  original  outpost  line  of  the  forward  zone. 
The  outposts  will  continue  their  methodical  retirement  from  the 
outpost  line  to  the  line  of  resistance  of  the  forward  zone,  and 
will  be  absorbed  into  the  garrison  of  the  latter.  At  6.15  a.  m., 
as  prearranged,  the  barrage  will  jump  back  to  our  original  out- 
post line.  The  infantry  will  make  a  stand  in  the  line  of  re- 
sistance of  the  forward  zone,  retiring  to  the  main  line  of  re- 
sistance under  pressure  from  the  enemy  or  on  receipt  of  an 
order.  Subsequent  action  will  be  regulated  in  accordance  with 
the  second  subparagraph  of  paragraph  9  (a). 

(rf)  Those  portions  of  the  outpost  line  of  the  forward  zone 
which  are  not  attacked  will  hold  their  ground  and  cover  their 
exposed  flank  by  throwing  it  back.  They  can  be  further  stiffened 
by  pushing  up  weak  supports  from  the  line  of  resistance  of  the 
forward' zone.  They  will  only  retire  to  the  latter  when  forced 
to  do  so  by  threat  of  envelopment.  The  line  of  resistance  of 
the  forward  zone  will  then  be  held  according  to  plan. 

10.  The  signal  "  Lift  your  fire  "  means  that  the  artillery  is  to 
increase  its  range  by  100  meters.  The  reason  for  the  signal 
may  be  either  that  our  artillery  is  firing  short,  i.  e.,  shelling  our 
own  infantry,  or  that  an  attack  which  has  been  repulsed  is  to 
be  followed  by  artillery  fire  as  it  retires. 

Every  time  the  signal  is  repeated  the  artillery  will  again  in- 
crease its  range  by  100  meters.  Attempts  must  be  made  and  all 
means  should  be  employed  to  ascertain  exactly  where  the  flare 
signals  are  being  sent  up,  in  order  to  prevent  our  barrage  being 
withdrawn  from  the  front  of  our  main  line  of  resistance  when 
it  is  still  needed  by  our  infantry.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that 
the  British,  in  order  to  induce  us  to  lift  our  fire  from  points 
where  it  is  particularly  accurate,  often  imitate  our  flare  signal 
"Lift  your  fire."  The  range  will,  therefore,  only  be  increased 
in  response  to  flare  signals  if  the  sector  in  which  the  flare 
signals  are  being  given  can  be  established  with  some  degree  of 
certainty.  The  same  applies  to  the  signal  for  "  Shorten  range," 
which  must  only  be  given  by  the  company  commander  or  some 
senior  officer. 


70  .      GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS. 

Flare  signals  for  "Lift  your  fire"  will  not  apply  to  barrage 
and  destructive  fire  on  the  areas  in  front  of  the  foremost  line  of 
our  defensive  zone  which  have  been  registered  with  direct  ob- 
servation. 

The  cooperation  of  the  artillery  survey  sections  is  of  the 
greatest  value  in  fixing  the  point  at  which  the  flare  signals  are 
being  sent  up,  as  they  can  determine  the  exact  point  where  the 
signal  was  given  by  means  of  intersection  on  the  flares.  They 
will  report  the  result  of  the  intersection  as  quickly  as  possible 
to  the  artillery  commanders,  who  will  transmit  it  by  the  quickest 
means  available  to  the  batteries  concerned  which  are  firing  in 
this  sector. 

11.  The  white  flare  signal  for  "  Shorten  range  "  will  be  given 
from  the  main  line  of  resistance  (by  a  company  commander  or 
senior  officer)  if  it  is  seen  that  the  troops  stationed  in  the  line 
of  resistance  of  the  forward  zone  are  retiring  from  it. 

Flare  signals  for  "  Shorten  range "  should  only  be  provided 
for  the  main  line  of  resistance.  This  flare  signal  should  not  be 
issued  to  the  forward  zone,  in  order  to  prevent  it  being  used  at 
the  wrong  time. 

12.  The  main  point  in  all  alterations  in  the  range  of  -the  artil- 
lery fire  is  direct  observation  of  the  battle  field,  which  provides 
the  most  certain  means  of  obtaining  a  clear  idea  of  the  situa- 
tion and  of  deciding  as  to  the  targets  to  be  fired  at.     Emphasis 
must  once  more  be  laid  on  the  fact  that  an  artillery  liaison 
officer  must  be  attached  to  every  commander  of  the  troops  in 
line,  and  must  be  amply  provided  with  telephone  wire,  with 
his  own  runners  drawn  from  the  artillery,  and  with  all  other 
means  of  communication  (wireless,  carrier  pigeons,  etc.).    It  is 
essential  that  every  battery  and  every  subgroup  be  supplied 
with  a  close-observation  post. 

13.  Balloons  and  airmen  should  be  provided  with  flare  signals 
for  barrage  fire,  annihilating  fire,  and  "  Shorten  range."    On 
days  of  very  heavy  fighting  they  must  pay  particular  attention 
to  observing  where  these  signals  are  being  given  in  our  front 
line,  and  will  call  the  attention  of  the  artillery  to  the  signals 
which  are  being  sent  up  by  the  front  line  by  repeating  them. 
Balloons  must  also  endeavor,  by  means  of  lines  of  direction  laid 
far  in  advance  of  the  balloon  beds,  to  establish  the  points  at 
which  the  individual  flare  signals  are  being  sent  up,  and  the 
information  derived  from  their  observation  in  this  way  must  be 
transmitted  to  the  artillery  command  posts,  with  which  they 


GERMAN  NOTES  ON  MINOR  TACTICS.  71 

are  connected  by  telephone.  It  is  the  duty  of  airmen,  as  soon 
as  they  have  established  the  points  at  which  the  flare  signals 
are  being  sent  up,  to  transmit  by  wireless  the  meaning  of  the 
flare  signals  and  the  points  from  which  they  are  being  sent  up. 

14.  These  tactics  of  altering  range  aim  at  simplification  and 
at  preventing  the  enemy  from  passing  through  our  barrage  fire 
as  well  as  enabling  us  to  withdraw  our  infantry  without  its  com- 
ing under  our  own  fire. 

15.  Regiments  will  practice  these  tactics  immediately  and  ex- 
plain their  object  to  the  men.     In  these  operations  emphasis 
must  again  and  again  be  laid  on  the  fact  that  the  British  infan- 
tryman is  in  no  sense  the  equal  of  our  infantry  as  soon  as  our 
infantry  gets  to  grips  with  him  in  a  counter  attack. 

( Signed )  BEAUCHITSCH. 


o 


FOURTEEN  DAY  USE 

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l9OcV55E° 

OCT5     1955  IU 

SEPl  0  1988 

AUTODiSC.SEP  01*88 

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